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THE ERIE OUTCOME TEST AS A GUIDE TO
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER
I
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A case coming before a court may be classified as either foreign or
domestic. A domestic case is either one in which all the operative
facts have taken place in the state in which the court is sitting or one
in which the forum has determined that its approach will not be
affected by the foreign elements of the case. A foreign case is one in
which some or all of the operative facts have occurred elsewhere, so
that the court must determine to what extent reference must be
made to the law of another state1 in order to decide the case. The
purpose of this article is to determine to what extent such reference
will be made once it has been decided that the case is a foreign one.
It was originally thought that the forum gave "comity" to the
law of another state.2 In more recent times, however, it has been
recognized that this is merely an explanation after the event and not a
description of the process by which the forum decides whether refer-
ence is to be made to the law of another state. The Restatement
and a probable majority of the courts have adopted the simpler ex-
planation that the forum enforces a "right" created by another state.4
Robert Allen Sedler is Assistant Professor of Law at the Saint Louis University
School of Law.
1. In conflict of laws "state" means any geographical portion of the earth's surface
having an independent system of law. All portions of a federal system are states, though
they are not fully sovereign and are not States of the Union.
2. In this country the theory was primarily developed by Joseph Story, the first
American writer on the conflict of laws. His great work- was Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws (1834). The significance of the comity theory lies in its emphasis on
territoriality as the basis of power to create rights and liabilities. This finds expression
in the concept of in personam jurisdiction and forms the basis of "long-arm" statutes-
a state's power over acts occurring there gives it the power to adjudicate rights and
liabilities with respect to such acts. The doctrine has significance in a negative sense
even when power is not in issue. Statutes are held to be presumed not to apply extra-
territorially. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 US. 347 (1909). But see
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), where the presumption ias rebutted
because of prospective harmful effects.
3. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 1 (1934).
4. Professor Beale has been the most articulate exponent of this theory. His great
work, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935), fully develops the theory as applied to
the various phases of conflicts of law. The classic judicial opinions are those of Justice
Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 US. 120 (1904), and Judge Cardozo in
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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Despite its simplicity, this explanation contains some fallacies' and
is not consistent with the approach taken in certain types of cases.'
While a discussion of the theories of the nature of the conflict of laws
is necessarily beyond the scope of this writing,7 it is often necessary for
an author who is dealing with conflicts problems to state the theory
under which he is proceeding. The theory employed herein is that
aspect of the local law theory developed by the late Walter Wheeler
Cook.
The local law theory developed contemporaneously with the
vested rights theory. As propounded by such writers as Wharton and
Lorenzen,8 the local law theory recognizes that a court administers no
law but its own. However, where a case is characterized as foreign,
the court decides that the law of another state shall to some extent
be used as a model in deciding the case. The law of the locus is "in-
corporated by reference." Judge Learned Hand has talked in terms of
a "highly homologous right," which is created by the locus and used
by the forum as a model.'
The theory was further refined by Professor Walter Wheeler
Cook in recognition of the fact that the conflict of laws, like all
branches of law, reflects social and economic policies of the administer-
ing court as well as that court's notions of justice.10 According to Cook,
5. Professor Cook has effectively demonstrated the fallacies. See Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 16-39 (1942).
6. For example, where the forum rejects the renvoi, it enforces a "right" that does
not exist at the locus, since the locus would be looking to the forum to determine if that
right existed.
7. For an excellent discussion see Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws:
Their Role and Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1945).
8. See Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws (1947); Wharton, Conflict
of Laws (3d ed. 1905).
9. See particularly his opinions in Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938),
and Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
10. For a discussion of the Hand and Cook approaches see Cavers, The Two "Local
Law" Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822 (1950). The author suggests that Hand's should be
called the "homologous right theory" and Cook's, the "local law theory." Id. at 831-32.
The difference between the approaches is demonstrated by Hand's opinion in Slegmann
v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). There the husband was sued for an assault which
the wife committed in Florida. The husband was not present, and suit was based on
coverture liability imposed by Florida law. The federal district court held that enforce-
ment of coverture liability would be denied on public policy grounds. The appellate
court affirmed, but on the theory that Florida could not create a "right" against the
husband, since he was not present and had not "consented" to legislative jurisdiction,
The husband had contended that the Florida statute was not applicable to him, but
the court found it unnecessary to reach that question in view of its approach to the
problem.
Under Cook's approach, however, the first question to be decided would have been
how Florida would have decided this very case. If Florida would not hold the statute
applicable, then the forum should not use its law as a model. In making that predlctlon,
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the forum decides by means of a prediction how hypothetical judicial
officials at the locus would decide this very case if it were presented to
them. Ignoring abstract propositions of law developed in cases that
the locus would characterize as domestic, the forum decides what the
locus would do with the case. The decision is based not only upon
what the locus has done in similar cases, but also upon a consideration
of the various policies the locus appears to be trying to implement.
The forum then decides what it will do with the case before it, that
is, to what extent it will use the lex loci as a model. Under Cook's
approach the reference to foreign law need not be unitary. The in-
corporation is limited where the policies sought to be implemented by
the locus conflict with legitimate interests sought to be protected by
the forum. This approach is very flexible and is designed to insure
results which are sound in the individual case rather than decisions
which are in accord with some abstract proposition. This approach will
be employed in describing the process of looking to the foreign law.
Initially the forum must determine whether the case is potentially
a foreign one. If it is, the court must decide which state's law will be
used as a model with respect to various aspects of the transaction. The
first step in making this decision is the characterization of the question
of law as one of tort law, contract law, family law, or the like. This
should not be a conceptualization, but a device by which conflicting
policies are sharply focused and a value judgment made. Once the
principal question has been categorized, a choice of law rule will follow
almost automatically. If the question is characterized as one of tort
law, it is governed by the lex loci delicti; if family law or decedent
estate law, usually by the lex domiciii; if contract law, by either the
lex loci contractus, the law of the place of performance, the place the
parties intended, or the center of gravity; if real property law, by
the lex loci rei sitae; and so on.
For example, let us say that the issue is one of interspousal im-
munity from tort liability. The wife is suing her husband in Wisconsin
for injuries suffered in an automobile accident in Illinois. Both parties
are Wisconsin domiciliaries. Under the law of the forum the suit can
be maintained; under the law of Illinois, where the accident occurred,
it cannot. If the principal question is characterized as one of family
law rather than tort law, the logical choice of law rule looks to the
lex domicilii. By looking to the lex domicilii the court can protect its
the forum would try to determine what policies Florida was trying to promote by
coverture liability. If it found that Florida would decide to hold the husband liable,
then it would have to decide whether it should use the law of Florida as a model to
impose liability on the husband, in view of its own policies and interests.
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domiciliaries. Its policy is in effect to permit the injured spouse to
recover against the husband's insurer despite the possibility of col-
lusion or disruption of marital unity.1
The next step is to determine the locus to which the choice of law
rule looks. For example, the forum may have to decide what is the lex
loci delicti. Is it the place where the defendant acted or the place where
the injury occurred? Answering this question may be called character-
izing the contact point. This characterization is also made with
reference to the policies of the forum.12 If the defendant has com-
mitted in the forum acts of a kind which the court wants to deter, the
place where the defendant acted will probably be held to be the locus
delicti.'
3
At this point the forum has determined a particular locus, the law
of which it is prepared to use as a model. Assuming no question of the
renvoil4 or public policy,"5 the forum can predict what the locus
11. See Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959),
which reached this result. Compare the less sophisticated technique employed to apply
the lex fori in Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936), where the court
characterized the question as one of tort law, but held it was against its public policy
to permit suit by one spouse against another.
12. The forum's concept of domicile will be employed to determine if a party ling
acquired a domicile, even though a different result would be reached under the concepts
of the state in which the forum finds him domiciled. In re Annesley, (1926] 1 Ch. 692.
See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 10 (1934). In Annesley, the forum thought that
the estate of a deceased Englishwoman should be administered with reference to the law
of a state where she resided and where she had the intention to remain. It was not in-
terested in the law of that state except as it was her domicile, and thus was not concerned
with its concept of domicile. But compare the approach taken in the same case to the
problem of the renvoi.
13. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 NAV.2d 365 (1957),
holding that a party selling liquor to an intoxicated person in the forum was liable under
the forum's Dram Shop Act, even though the actual injury occurred in another state.
14. The problem arises when the locus looks back to the forum or to a third state
(here it is more accurately called the envoi). A discussion of methods of resolving the
renvoi is necessarily beyond the scope of this 'article. Generally, American courts still
apply the lex lod, that is, reject the renvoi. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 7 (1934).
But see Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Surr. Ct. 1990), where the
court accepted the renvoi and applied its own law on the ground that the locus would
have applied New York law. Note that it still did not reach the question whether the locus
would apply New York law where New York would have applied the lox loci If the
case had arisen in New York.
15. By "public policy," I mean the refusal to enforce a claim that the forum con-
siders highly undesirable. The doctrine received great emphasis under the comity theory,
where the mere fact that the foreign law was different was said in some cases to make it
against the forum's public policy to enforce it. See Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App.
323, 259 Pac. 374 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927). The more realistic approach was that the forum
would enforce the claim unless to do so would violate "some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of tle
common weal." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
But note the result in Ciampittielo v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947),
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would do and act on the prediction to fashion a rule of decision in the
particular case. It should be noted that the law of more than one
state may govern different issues. For example, the law of the state
where the parties attempted to make a contract may govern as to the
issue of whether a contract was made, while the law of the place of
intended performance may govern as to matters relating to per-
formance. For the purposes of this article, I will talk in terms of a locus
on a particular issue, but will refer generically to the locus.
Even though the case has been characterized as foreign and the
court has decided to look to the law of the locus as a model, it must
be remembered that the forum cannot become a court of the locus. It
cannot suspend its normal operations and bring over every aspect
of the law of the locus. This was recognized as soon as the concept of
looking to foreign law developed. How much of the lex loci will the
forum use as a model and how will this quantitative determination be
made?
It was early decided that matters of "procedure" ought to be
governed by the law of the forum, and matters of "substance" by the
law of the locus. This line of demarcation continues to be accepted. 0
Although a vast amount of case law has developed in applying this
rule, it is submitted that no test has been devised which will enable
courts accurately to draw the line between substantive and procedural
matters. Conceptually, it is possible to draw a meaningful distinction
between substance and procedure. We can say that "substance" refers
to whether a right or liability exists, and "procedure" refers to the
method by which the right is enforced or the liability imposed. The
real difficulty arises, however, when this conceptual distinction is
employed in an area where the solution of problems is not dependent
upon distinctions between the existence of a right and the method of
enforcing it. This difficulty has been compounded because courts
have employed this conceptualized distinction between substance and
procedure to reach results in a number of situations, each of which
raises different policy considerations. We shall combine these different
situations17 into three major categories: (1) local law; (2) Eric;18
and (3) the conflict of laws.
where both the majority and the dissent based their reasoning on this test. The majority
denied recovery of proceeds from parimutuel betting, which was illegal in the forum.
To the extent that the forum's characterization and choice of law rules cause it to look
to its own law when its real interests are involved, and to the extent that courts are
becoming less parochial, the doctrine is decidedly on the -%ane.
16. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934).
17. They are set forth in Cook, supra note 5, at 163-6S. Some of the categories are
now changed because of the differing role of the federal courts in the post-Erie situation.
18. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Closely analogous is the "rever e
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Local law.-In two types of cases which contain no foreign ele-
ment, courts draw the distinction between substance and procedure
to determine the validity of action taken within the state. The most
common situation occurs when legislation is challenged on the ground
that it has operated retroactively to destroy rights. Retroactive leg-
islation is said to be constitutional if it affects 'matters of procedure,
but not if it affects substantive rights. The rationale is that while it
would be unfair to altef established interests retroactively, it is not
unfair to alter the mode of enforcing such interests since people do not
expect that the mode of enforcement will remain constant. The test is
whether the legislation is fair with a view toward the expectation
interests of the persons affected."0 Applying this test, it has been
held, for example, that the legislature can constitutionally change
the burden of proving contributory negligence and apply the statute
to causes of action arising before its enactment.20 No one could expect
that the burden of proof would necessarily remain constant from the
time of injury to the time of trial, though one could expect that con-
tributory negligence would continue to remain a defense.
The other common situation in the local law area invol\,es the
rule-making power of the court, which is limited to matters of
procedure. The question is one of the proper relationship between the
courts and the legislature. The court is legitimately concerned only with
matters relating to the process by which interests are enforced. "2
Here again, the analytical basis of the distinction is sound when the
underlying rationale is considered. In other words, in determining
whether vested interests have been impaired by retroactive legislation
or whether the court has exceeded its rule-making powers, it is proper
to ask whether the matter relates to the existence' of a right or liability
or to the mode of its enforcement.
Erie.-For Erie purposes "substance and procedure" is a phrase
with a quite different meaning. Under the Rules of Decision Act,"
where state law is in issue23 as to matters of "substance," the law
Erie" situation, where the state court is enforcing a federal statutory right, for example,
under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Here the question is largely one of statutory
interpretation, i.e., to what extent does Congress require the state courts to follow federal
procedure. The problem is discussed in Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA
Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 Ohio St. L.J. 384 (1996).
19. See Cook, supra note 5, at 165-66.
20. See, e.g., Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 235 U.S. 380 (1914).
21. It has been held by at least one court that under the state constitution the legisla-
ture does not have the power to make prQcedural rules in violation of those established
by the court. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877
(1950).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
23. This occurs primarily in cases where jurisdiction is founded on diversity of
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which controls is the law of the state in which the federal court sits.24
An extended discussion of the Erie doctrine and the problems it raises
is necessarily beyond the scope of this article. The Eric doctrine can be
understood only in light of the reasoning upon which diversity jurisdic-
tion is based. Diversity jurisdiction is intended to prevent local bias
against an out-of-state litigant by insuring control of the trial by a
federal judge who enjoys life tenure and is free from local pressures.F
While juries are drawn from within the state, the federal judge can
insure a fair trial to the out-of-state litigant. Since this is the sole basis
for diversity jurisdiction, the outcome of each case should be the same
in the federal court as it would be in a state court. Therefore, all
matters materially affecting the outcome of the case are considered
"substantive" and must be determined by state law.20
Many matters relating to the mode of enforcement materially
affect the outcome of cases, and state law has been held to govern
such matters.27 Since the underlying rationale of the substance-
procedure distinction is basically different for Erie and local law
purposes, it is not surprising that the analytical basis of the distinction
is sound in the latter situation and completely inapplicable in the
former.2" In view of the difference in the underlying rationale, it is
immaterial that the same words are used.
There are some situations in which state law is not applied for
Erie purposes even though the matter in issue materially affects the
outcome. The role of a federal court in the federal system prevents
that court from becoming "only another court of the state." -  Federal
courts do not have the same source of authority as state courts. For
example, the practice of having the issue of contributory negligence
citizenship. In the other areas where reference is made to state law, the courts were more
likely to look to the state decisions even before Erie.
24. Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case has given rise to extensive
comment. An excellent discussion shortly after the decision which accurately predicted
its future course is Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and 'Procedure"
After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 III. L. Rev. 271 (1939). For a discussion of the
doctrine in light of more recent developments see Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution, 53 Nw. UL.. Rev. 427, 451 (19S8).
25. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1945).
26. Id. at 108-09.
27. These include such matters as burdens of proof, see notes 193-212 infra and
accompanying text, and statutes of limitations, see notes 146-71 infra and accompanying
text.
28. The different meanings of the terms for local law, Erie, and conflicts purposes
are discussed in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 US. 650
(1940).
29. The role of federal courts in diversity cases was referred to in these terms in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). The expression is an unfortunate
one, and is another example of the potential danger in loose terminology.
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decided by the jury which is followed in some states is not binding on
the federal courts, since the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment includes the right to have a directed verdict in a
proper case. ° Similarly, the fact that the state courts would have an
issue determined by the judge is not binding on the federal courts
where the issue is properly triable by the jury.31 It has not been
definitely established whether the latter result is necessarily compelled
by the Seventh Amendment, 2 but, in any event, it represents a limita-
tion on the outcome test. Certain matters must be controlled by federal
procedural policy or other requirements of the federal constitution,
even though they may materially affect the outcome of the case. 3
Conflicts.-The question that must be answered next is why
courts should distinguish substance and procedure for conflicts pur-
poses. That the forum is concerned with the customary operation of its
own judicial machinery does not answer the question of how much of
the law of the locus should be used as a model. A determination must
first be made as to why the forum looks to the lex loci as a model. The
answer is that the forum-through the process previously outlined-
decides that the case is a foreign one and that certain issues are to be
determined with reference to the law of another state. In making that
judgment, the forum decides that it has no interest in the rights and
liabilities involved in the case, but is merely serving as a forum of
convenience. The court hears the case because it desires to or because
of constitutional compulsion.34 Ideally, suit should have been brought
in another state-the state with such an interest in the transaction that
its law must be used as a model by the forum. Where the law of more
than one state is looked to as a model to determine different issues,
however, the ideal situation is impossible.
30. Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942). The same result
was reached in the pre-Erie case of Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931), at
a time when the federal courts were bound to follow state procedural law.
31. Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 360 U.S. 273 (1959); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
32. The Court did not decide in either of the cases cited in the previous footnote
whether the Seventh Amendment applied. Both cases involved workmen's compensation
proceedings, which would not have constituted a suit at common law. In fact, in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., supra note 31, the Court specifically refused to consider
the question. For the view that the result is required by the Seventh Amendment, see
Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of
Their Conflict, 37 Texas L. Rev. 549 (1959).
33. This problem is discussed at greater length in the section of the article dealing
with judge-jury allocation. See notes 259-80 infra and accompanying text,
34. In certain instances the full faith and credit clause and possibly the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause require the forum to open its doors to claims arising
under the law of a sister state. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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Where the ideal situation either does not or cannot prevail, the
forum should, as far as possible, try to insure that the result in its
courts will be the same as the result would have been if suit had been
brought at the locus. Therefore, the forum should incorporatc by ref-
erence as much of the law of the locus as is likely to bear materially
on the ultimate outcome irrespective of whether the matter is ana-
lytically characterized as one of substance or procedure. This argument
has been advocated for some time.35 There is no problem when the
issue is analytically one of substance. It is only when the issue is ana-
lytically procedural that the underlying rationale of looking to the law
of another state as a model must be considered.
The forum fails to consider the law of the locus as a model if it
automatically rules that all matters which are analytically procedural
are to be governed by the lex Jori. A similar objection can be made
when the forum automatically accepts the locus' characterization of a
point of law as procedural, even though the cases at the locus involve
problems of local law and not of conflicts. Even the fact that the locus
has characterized a particular matter as procedural for conflicts pur-
poses should not be controlling on the forum. The forum is merely
using the law of the locus as a model; its purpose should be to achieve
the same result as would occur at the locus. If the matter bears
materially on the outcome, the forum should incorporate the lex loci as
a model. The locus' characterization of the issue is irrelevant from the
forum's standpoint. It does not solve the problem to say that analytical
characterization is not harmful because the correct result will be
produced in the majority of cases, or because the court will decide
doubtful cases correctly. 0 As will be demonstrated, the courts have
treated many matters as procedural which have materially affected the
outcome of cases, and have therefore failed to look to the lex loci as a
model.
It will also be seen, however, that courts often apply the law of
the locus in analytically procedural matters. This is done on an ad hoc
basis without any consistent guide. It is submitted that the Eric out-
come test can furnish such a guide, for the underlying rationale for the
application of the state law in an Erie situation is substantially the
35. See Cook, supra note 6, at 166; McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Pro-
cedure in the Conflict of -Laws, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933 (1930) ; Morgan, Choice of Lay,
Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1944).
36. Mr. Ailes has contended that there is "surprisingly little difference in result be-
tween the existing precedents and Professor Cook's program.' Ailes, Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 393, 413 (1941). Professor Cook
admits that the practice of the courts is generally better than their theory, but points
out that sooner or later bad theory will lead to bad results. Cook, supra note S, at 186.
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same as the rationale for the application of the lex loci in a conflicts
situation. The sole purpose of a federal court in a diversity case is to
furnish an impartial forum. The only purpose of a court in a conflicts
case, once it has decided that it will look to the law of another state,
is to serve as a forum of convenience. In each situation the court
should use as a model as much of the law of the reference point as will
materially affect the outcome. It is conceded, of course, that matters
which are analytically substantive will materially affect the outcome.
Therefore there can be no objection to drawing the substantive-
procedural distinction initially, provided the inquiry does not terminate
once something has been characterized as analytically procedural.
The application of the Erie test to the law of conflicts is intended
as one of the contributions of this article. This application has already
been suggested, at least in the sense that Erie is recognized as having
had some influence on the broadening concept of procedure. 7 Thus,
in the recent case of Hausman v. Buckley, 8 the court drew an analogy
to an Erie case in determining what should be decided in accordance
with the law of the locus in a conflicts situation. 9 It is submitted that
the outcome test of Erie may furnish a guide for the determination of
the extent to which the lex loci should be incorporated in dealing with
a conflicts problem.
The second aspect of the outcome test must be considered as well.
It has been noted that the forum must be free to operate its judicial
machinery in its customary manner. Just what does this mean? Other
discussions of the outcome test as a guide in conflicts cases have talked
in terms of the inconvenience to the forum of having to bring over
certain aspects of the law of the locus4° or "weighty practical considera-
tions [that] demand the application of the law of the forum.141 More
than a mere question of practicality is involved, however. It has been
emphasized that the court of the forum cannot become a court of
another state. It must operate its judicial system as it sees fit. The
37. See Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 Vand. L. Roy.
467, 470 (1957).
38. 299 F.2d 696, 701 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962). This case Is dis-
cussed in greater detail in the section dealing with maintenance of suit. See notes 127-28
infra and accompanying text.
39. In Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940), the court indicated an awareness that each situation has its own ratlonale, but
nonetheless recognized a relationship between the Erie and conflicts of law situations. Thu
"cnovel" approach of Sampson v. Channell is now accepted in theory. Dispute arises
over its application in the conflicts area. The Supreme Court cannot answer this question
as it answers the ones arising under Erie.
40. Cook, supra note 5, at 169.
41. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 195 (1944).
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historical justification for drawing substance-procedure distinctions
was sound to the extent that it recognized this fact.42 The error was
made in employing the analytical substance-procedure distinction to
determine how much of the law of the locus should be brought over.
There are many matters, analytically procedural, which materially
affect the outcome of the litigation and which can be brought over by
the forum without any interference with the efficient operation of its
judicial system.43
This being so, why have courts hesitated to bring over many
aspects of the law of the locus that will materially affect the outcome
but would cause no such interference? Apart from the failure to realize
that analytical characterization is improper in the conflicts situation
(and not all courts have been guilty of this), it is suggested that courts
have been concerned with their own procedural policy. Professor
Lorenzen has used the term, "matter . . . of a nature to pass con-
veniently and without ethical shock through the legal machinery of the
forum."" Professor Morgan has spoken of matters of the lex loci that
analytically deal with procedure as the forum's "public policy.""
Underlying these ideas is the recognition that the forum which is
trying the case has been convinced by experience that certain things
must be done in the course of litigation in order to insure a proper and
fair result. The difference between the law of the forum and that of the
locus may actually be much greater in matters which are analytically
procedural. The common law, and even statutory law, does not really
differ that much from state to state. But lawyers and judges con-
stantly try to alter the method of judicial enforcement. Thus, even
though a matter may materially affect the outcome, the forum will not
and should not use the lex loci as a model if to do so would interfere
with the forum's strong procedural policy. For this policy embodies
methods which experience has taught the forum are necessary for the
administration of justice.
42. As Professor Lorenzen has pointed out in The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict.
of Laws, 32 Yale L.J. 311, 332 (1923):
The wide meaning given to the term "procedure" in the Conflict of Laws
has already done much mischief. Our courts would do well to keep in mind the
real meaning of the rule that all matters of procedure are governed by the
local law of the forum. The sole object of the rule is to enable the courts to
operate the judicial machinery in the customary manner. There are vast dif-
ferences in the technical rules controlling the conduct of litigation under the
systems of procedure prevailing in the different countries and any attempt
to try a "foreign" cause of action in accordance with the rules of the state or
country in which it arose would be doomed to failure.
43. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 155-56 (2d ed. 1951).
44. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and The Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale L.J. 311,
332 (1923).
45. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 19S (1944).
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The procedural policy of the forum should be distinguished from
its "public policy," which may cause the court to refuse to entertain a
claim that it considers highly improper. 40 The forum has a legitimate
interest in the procedure of enforcing substantive rights which arise
under the law of another state. The operative events of enforcement
take place in the forum. This gives the forum an interest not present
when it is asked merely to recognize the law of another state. The
forum is responsible for the procedure of enforcing substantive rights
under the lex loci. Thus a court hesitates to incorporate the foreign
law as to matters analytically procedural either because the matter
offends its notions as to how a trial should be conducted or because of
the fear that by incorporating foreign procedure it will in the future
find that it must incorporate something that offends its strong pro-
cedural policy.
Again, a court faced with such a problem needs a guide, and it is
submitted that Erie furnishes this guide. As the previous discussion
has indicated, matters materially affecting the outcome will not be
determined by state law when they violate matters such as the relation-
ship between judge and jury. There is a difference, however, between
the Erie and conflicts situations if the federal courts are limited to the
procedural policy as expressed in other constitutional provisions..4 7
Obviously no such limitation exists in a conflicts situation, and the
forum may give full play to its strong procedural policy. When the
courts realize that in a proper case they are to refuse to bring over the
lex loci that offends their strong procedural policy, they will not hesi-
tate to bring it over, even when different, if the matter is one that does
not involve a strong procedural policy of the forum. Therefore, the
following test is proposed for determining how much of the lex loci
the forum should use as a model: To the extent that the matter in
question materially affects the outcome of the case, the forum should
-use the lex loci as a model except where to do so would interfere with
the efficient operation of the forum's judicial system or violate a strong
procedural policy of the forum.48
This is the same test that exists for Erie purposes, with the pos-
sible exception that procedural policy of the federal courts is limited
to that which is contained in the Constitution. Note that the test makes
no reference to substance and procedure as the line of demarcation.
46. As to the meaning and significance of "public policy," see note 15 supra.
47. See Whicher, supra note 32.
48. Note that this is basically the same test proposed by Professor Morgan in Choice
-of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1944). However, he does not
-elaborate on this aspect.
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Further, the test contains no exception based upon public policy. Con-
siderations of public policy are important only in the initial determina-
tion of whether or not the forum should hear the case.4 9 If the forum
decides not to hear the case, there is no issue as to how much of the
lex loci should be incorporated.
The test can be applied on a sliding scale basis. If it is not clear
whether the matter materially affects the outcome, and if there is a.
strong possibility that incorporation of the lex loci will interfere with
the effective operation of the forum's judicial system or violate a strong
procedural policy, then the lex loci should not be used as a model ." If
the matter may affect the outcome and does not interfere with the
operation or violate the policy, then the lex loci should be used as a
model. If the matter clearly affects the outcome and will only cause
some slight interference or possibly violate some procedural policy, then
the lex lod should probably be incorporated. Three clear cases are
where the matter: (1) does not materially affect the outcome (no in-
corporation); (2) violates a strong procedural policy or interferes with
the efficient operation of the judicial system (no incorporation); and
(3) materially affects the outcome, but causes no interference and does
not violate a strong procedural policy (incorporation).
To some extent the cases indicate that the courts may be em-
ploying this approach without clearly articulating it. But there are too
many cases in which courts have refused to use the lex loci as a model,
even though a matter materially affected the outcome, and even though
there existed no countervailing considerations to justify the refusal. By
establishing a standard, courts can approach the problem more real-
istically and are more likely to arrive at sound results.
II
APPLICATION OF THE TEST
At the outset it may be well to note the situations which require
federal courts to look to state law for Erie purposes, but which present
no occasion for the forum to look to the lex loci in a conflicts case."'
The most obvious example is conflict of law rules, which are controlled
49. Note that a refusal to hear the case on public policy grounds is not a judgment
on the merits. See Glencove Granite Co. v. City Trust, Safe Deposit & Sur. Co., 118 Fed.
386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 649 (1902).
50. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. This wias really the approach taken in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 US. 526 (1958).
Si. It should be noted here that evidence questions are determined with a viewv
toward admissibility, so that if they are admissible under state law, no problem ill
arise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Thus in a conflicts situation there may be the problem of
evidence admissible at the locus, but not at the forum; this cannot arise under Erie.
This is an example of the converse of the problem discussed in this section.
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by state law for Erie purposes. 2 In a conflicts case, the forum initially
applies its own conflicts rules to identify the locus. Obviously, the
forum cannot look to the lex loci until the particular locus has been
identified. If the locus, once identified, presents different conflicts rules,
the problem is one of the renvoi or the envoi rather than one of how
much of the lex loci should be brought over. 3
A similar case is presented where the issue is one of venue or of
forum non conveniens." If the suit would have been dismissed in the
locus because of lack of contact with the transaction, it is difficult to
see how the forum could constitutionally use the lex loci as a model,
or why it would desire to do so.
For Erie purposes, it is not clear whether a foreign corporation's
amenability to suit is controlled by federal or state law." This question
will not arise in a conflicts situation. If the corporation is not subject
to suit under the statutes of the forum, the court simply cannot permit
the suit. The question which would be presented if the corporation
were subject to suit in the forum but not at the locus is unlikely to
arise. The elements of the case which make it desirable to bring over
the lex loci would doubtless be sufficient to make the corporation sub-
ject to suit at the locus under the various "long-arm" statutes. Where
a claim is void under the lex loci, there can be no question of refusing
to enforce a claim on the grounds that it violates public policy. 0
Questions of public policy arise only when the claim is valid at the
locus but runs counter to the public policy of the forum.
Remedies
Confusion has been caused in this area by treating remedies
as a matter of procedure. It is true that the question of remedies is
governed by the lex fori, but this rule does not rest on the distinction
between substance and procedure. The point is that the forum can give
only those remedies for which its judicial machinery is equipped. Thus,
if the lex loci specifies that recovery in workmen's compensation pro-
52. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
53. But note that under the "total reference approach" the forum attempts to reach
the same outcome as the reference state. See In re Annesley, [1926] 1 Cb. 692.
54. There is a split of authority in the federal courts as to whether forum non
tonveniens was abolished by the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Compare Headrick v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950), with Willis v. Well Pump Co.,
222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. See the discussion and citation of conflicting authorities in Jaftex Corp. v.
Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), where it was held that state law was
mot controlling.
56. For Erie purposes this is controlled by state law. Angel v. Bulington, 330 U.S.
183 (1947); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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ceedings must be had before an administrative agency, and the forum
does not have such an agency, the forum cannot give relief under the
statute.57
Specific Relief.-Because of the severity of contempt sanctions
for failure to comply with a decree of specific performance, the forum
will not look to the lex loci to determine if specific relief should be
granted. Full faith and credit does not require that the decree of a
sister state be recognized by granting specific relief, even though such
relief would be granted at the locus."8 The forum looks to the locus
as a model to determine liability, but decides whether it will grant
specific relief or damages. In making this decision, the forum will
consider whether the granting of specific relief would give the party
a different benefit than he would be entitled to under the lex loci.
Thus, in Galligan v. Galligan-Owen Corp., 9 the court refused to en-
join a sale of corporate assets where, under the law of the state of
incorporation, a shareholder objecting to a sale was only entitled to
redeem his shares. A similar situation arose in an Eric context in
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski. There a federal court refused to permit
a declaratory judgment action by an insurer against a party injured
by the insured. The state had a direct action statute, and its policy
was to have all issues, including coverage, decided in a single action.0'
This reasoning is equally applicable in a conflicts situation. Basically,
the forum will not grant specific relief when to do so would be to alter
the nature of the interest created by the locus. Regardless of the
practice of the locus, specific relief will also be denied where the forum
considers the case an improper one in which to grant such relief.
Execution-A further question arises with regard to the execu-
tion of a foreign judgment. Since execution takes place in the forum,
it can be granted only by the means available. Moreover, the forum
57. Green v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 161 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1947). See Slater v.
Mexican Natl R-R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), where the principle was applied to bar recovery
because under the lex loci delicti payment for wrongful death was to be in installments
subject to modification in the future.
58. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 449(1) (1934) and particularly comment
(a) to that section. Cases such as Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909), which held that a
state need not recognize a decree for specific performance to land located in the forum nor
order specific performance because this was done at the locus, are explainable on this
ground and not on the ground that "equity decrees" are not entitled to full faith and
credit. Cf. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910), holding that an alimony decree not
modifiable retroactively is entitled to ful faith and credit as to accrued payments.
59. 19 Misc. 2d 787, 187 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. CL 1959).
60. 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960).
61. See also Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Russell, 167 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Ark.
1958), recognizing that the state practice of limiting claims against minors to probate
proceedings prevented a federal court from allowing a creditor to maintain an equitable
garnishment action.
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gives execution on its own judgment and executes on property located
within its own jurisdiction. Therefore the forum has no reason to look
to the law of the locus as a model. It is well settled that such questions
as immunity of property from attachment are determined by the
lex fori.62
Extent of Recovery.-When, however, the extent of recovery is
involved, different considerations prevail. The question is not one of
determining what remedy shall be awarded. The fact that A has
wronged B is meaningless unless it is translated into a recovery in
terms of dollars and cents. A determination of the extent of loss is no
different from a determination of the existence of a wrong resulting in
a loss. The amount of recovery clearly affects the outcome, since it
involves the question of what B can ultimately get by way of com-
pensation. No procedural policy of the forum can be involved-the
trial is conducted in the same manner whether the plaintiff recovers
$1,000 or $10,000. Under Erie, it has never been questioned that the
measure of damages is determined by state law. It also seems to be
generally accepted that the measure of damages is determined by the
lex loci in a conflicts situation. 3 This includes punitive damages.14 In
Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank,", however, the court held
that the question of speculativeness of damages was governed by the
lex Jori. The decision can be explained, if at all, only on the grounds
that the court would not permit recovery for injury to the type of in-
terest involved, which was a credit rating. It is doubtful whether a
case like this would be followed today.
Consider, though, a case such as Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc.66 There the decedent, a New York domiciliary, boarded a plane
in New York. The plane crashed in Massachusetts, and a wrongful
death action was brought in New York.67 The Massachusetts wrongful
death statute set a maximum limit upon recovery. The New York
court, relying on somewhat confusing and imprecise reasoning, held
that the limitation did not apply. The court emphasized that the place
of injury had been fortuitous and that since the decedent had been
a New York domiciliary it would be against New York's public policy
62. See Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420 (1867); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 600
(1934).
63. Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 AUt. 794 (1925); Stevens
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 SAV.2d 122 (Mo. 1962).
64. Roseberry v. Scott, 120 Kan. 576, 244 Pac. 1063 (1926); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Lynch, 137 Ky. 696, 126 SAV. 362 (1910).
65. 127 Iowa 153, 98 NAV. 918 (1905).
66. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
67. A count on the theory of breach of warranty was dismissed on the ground that
the warranty did not give rise to a death action.
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to permit the limitation on damages. This use of public policy to defeat
a defense is quite questionable and is inconsistent with other New
York cases.68
The court in Kilberg based its decision on yet another ground,
one which it felt would permit the implementation of New York's
public policy without "doing violence to the accepted pattern of
conflict of law rules."69 Relying upon the general idea that the lex Jori
should govern as to matters of procedure, including remedies, the
court indicated that there was authority both ways as to whether the
measure of damages should be controlled by the lex Jor.7
Such reliance upon the substance-procedure distinction ignores
the fact that there is a difference between the nature of the remedy to
be awarded and the extent of recovery.71 The result reached in the
case is, however, correct under Cook's theory of the nature of the
conflict of laws. Assuming that the New York court found that
Massachusetts would apply the limitation in a similar case, the New
York court could still refuse to use that portion of Massachusetts law
as a model and could determine limitation of damages in accordance
with its own law.72 Massachusetts' contact was indeed largely fortui-
tous and New York had a substantial interest in the estate of its
domiciliary. Thus, there would seem to be no constitutional objection
to New York's applying its own law to determine the measure of
damages.73 The defendant would not be prejudiced by such a holding,
68. In Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798
(1938) (per curiam), the same court allowed the defendant in a breach of contract action
to assert the defense that a statute of the locus required the discharge of persons of the
Jewish faith from certain employment, even though the statute might have been against
its public policy.
In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Supreme Court expresly drew
the distinction between the use of the public policy technique to bar an action and a
defense, saying that a state "may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders
having no relation to anything done or to be done within them." Note that if the forum
decides it is but a forum of convenience, it would admit that nothing happened within
its borders that it was entitled to control.
69. 9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
70. In disagreeing with this conclusion, Judge Froessel stated that the court was
"undermining the accepted pattern of conflict of laws rules, in effect overruling numerous
decisions of this court, and completely disregarding the overwhelming weight of authority
in this country." 9 N.Y.2d at 46, 172 N.E.2d at 532, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
71. It is well settled that limitations in death actions are part of the measure of
damages. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 606(b) (1934).
72. In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd,
307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), motion for rehearing en banc granted, Sept. 13, 1962, the
lower court predicted that New York would apply its law of damages in a case involving
the same facts, since the plaintiff was a New York domiciliary.
73. Subsequent to the preparation of this article I discovered that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has disagreed with this position. In Pearson v.
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since he could not have been relying on Massachusetts law prior to
the crash.74
Although the case may be justified on these grounds, it is not
correct to say that the measure of damages is determined by the
lex ori.75 The measure of damages clearly affects the outcome and
does not conflict with the procedural policy of the forum and should,
for that reason, be determined by the lex loci. The case is valuable in-
sofar as it points up the necessity of distinguishing between matters
relating to the remedy and those relating to the extent of recovery.
The question of the rate of interest to be awarded will not arise
under Erie because there is no conflicting federal law. For conflicts
purposes, the proper result is exemplified by the holding in Scotland
County v. Hill."6 There it was held that interest on the claim should
be determined by the lex loci while interest on the judgment should be
determined by the lex fori. The amount of interest on the claim is
part of the measure of damages, and no question of conflict with the
Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), motion for rehearing en banc granted,
Sept. 13, 1962, the court, reversing the case cited in note 72 supra, held that full faith
and credit required New York to enforce the Massachusetts limitation. The rationale of
the decision was that since New York had held that the plaintiff's rights were under the
Massachusetts statute, full faith and credit required New York to enforce the statute in
its entirety. The Second Circuit stated that public policy could not be used to destroy a
defense. I agree with that. However, the court ignored the fact that there was no reliance
in the case and that the Massachusetts contact was largely fortuitous. The defendant was
in no way prejudiced because of reliance upon Massachusetts law. The court, as Judge
Kaufman pointed out in his dissent, was applying the vested rights theory and, in effect,
raising the doctrine of Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), to a con-
stitutional doctrine.
Judge Kaufman's dissent is excellent. Despite some references to "public policy," he
accurately characterizes the problem and emphasizes the fortuitous nature of Massachu-
setts' contact. As he points out, the majority did not say that New York could not
apply its statute, but stated that since it had chosen to apply the Massachusetts statute,
it had to do it completely. Judge Kaufman criticizes the vested rights theory and shows
how it has been discredited, making reference to Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws (1942). 194 F.2d at 141. His point is that because of New York's
interest New York may use its own law as a model on the issue of damages without
running afoul of full faith and credit.
After reading the case, I choose to abide by my original statement and predict that
if the case should come before the Supreme Court, Judge Kaufman's position will be
sustained. In such a case it is imperative that the Court have a full understanding of
the nature of Cook's theory and realize that it is compatible with the underlying principles
of full faith and credit where the interest of the locus in the case is comparatively slight
and the defendant is not prejudiced by the forum's failure to use the entire lex lad as a
model. It should be noted, moreover, that the Second Circuit has granted a motion for
rehearing en banc in the case.
74. This differentiates it from the problems discussed in note 68 supra and accom-
panying text.
75. It is submitted that the court will not extend the principle to other situations,
but will hold that damages are ordinarily governed by the lex loc.
76. 132 U.S. 107 (1889).
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forum's procedural policy can possibly exist. 7 The judgment, on the
other hand, is given by the forum, and no interest will be owing if the
judgment is "paid promptly. Charging interest on judgments which
are not paid promptly thus relates to enforcement of the judgment,
and is analogous to execution."8
Attorneys' Fees.-Attorneys' fees are also part of the measure
of damages so far as recovery is concerned. For Erie purposes, the
court looks to state law to determine whether an award may be made
for attorneys' fees.79 In a conflicts case, the law of the locus should
govern this matter; for its determination materially affects the amount
of recovery, and no procedural policy of the forum can be affected.
Thus, in Stokes v. Reeves"° the Montana federal district court cor-
rectly ruled that it would permit the recovery of attorneys' fees re-
coverable under the lex loci, although such fees were not recoverable
under Montana law.
A different question is presented where the forum would authorize
recovery of attorneys' fees in a particular case, but the locus would
not. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Simpson,8'1 the forum applied its
statute authorizing recovery of attorneys' fees against nonsettling
insurers, even though no such recovery was permitted by the lex loci.
The court reasoned that these fees were taxed as costs and that re-
covery of costs was governed by the lex fori.
It may be argued that to allow recovery of attorneys' fees repre-
sents an attempt by the forum to insure that litigants seeking to use
its courts will not be deterred by the cost of retaining counsel. If re-
covery of attorneys' fees were authorized in all cases, then it might be
argued that the forum's policy should control. But attorneys' fees are
often authorized only in certain types of actions as a device to en-
courage the settlement of claims. If this is the case, then the forum's
only concern is with those claims that its law governs and not with
all claims brought before its courts. Therefore, the lex fori governing
costs should not be applied when, by definition, the forum only hears
the case as a matter of convenience.
77. See Frasier v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 254 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 19S8)
(applying New York law). Contra, Hays v. Arbuckle, 72 Colo. 328, 211 Pac. 101 (1922),
holding that all questions of interest are determined by the lex fori.
78. But see Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842, 851 (Ist Cir. 19SS), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956) (applying Massachusetts law), holding that interest on the
verdict is determined by the lex loci. No reasoning was given, and it is doubtful if the
state court would agree.
79. Stokes v. Reeves, 245 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1957); American Optometric Ass'n v.
Rithoz, 101 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 647 (1939).
80. Stokes v. Reeves, 245 F.2d 700, 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1957).
81. 228 Ark. 157, 306 S.W.2d 117 (1957).
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Arbitration.-The question whether a court should order arbitra-
tion has also been said to relate to the remedy. That is sound only
to this extent: lacking authority, the forum cannot order arbitration
even where the courts at the locus have such authority. This is an-
other case in which the law of the locus cannot be taken as a model
because the forum lacks the judicial machinery to enforce the interest
created by the locus. But this does not justify the result in a case such
as Shafer v. MGM Distrib. Corp.,2 where the court, in refusing to
entertain an action on an arbitrator's award, declared that whether
such agreements are enforceable is a question of procedure to be
determined by the lex Jori. The forum in that case was not being asked
to enforce the agreement by ordering arbitration. It was merely being
asked to enforce the award as any other judgment. Since the forum
was not called upon to employ judicial machinery it did not have, the
question of whether the forum could grant the remedy should never
have arisen.
The characterization of arbitration as a remedies question to be
decided by the lex Jori leads to a correct result only where the forum
lacks the machinery to order arbitration. The reverse of the ques-
tion is presented when the forum can order arbitration, but when
arbitration would not or could not be ordered by the locus. Should
the forum order arbitration in such a case? The question was pre-
sented in an Erie context in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America."
Under state law, arbitration could not be compelled. The plaintiff
sought relief under the Federal Arbitration Act. Jurisdiction was based
on diversity of citizenship, for the transaction did not involve inter-
state commerce. The court held that if arbitration could not be com-
pelled in the state court, it could not be compelled in the federal court.
It was further held that the federal arbitration statute is inapplicable
where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship."
In concluding that the outcome of the case would be materially
82. 36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N.E. 689 (1929).
83. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
84. If Erie represented a constitutional doctrine, then the Federal Arbitration Act
would be unconstitutional as applied to such a situation. The Court construed the statute
narrowly to avoid raising the constitutional question. Subsequently it has been held that
the act creates an independent federal right to arbitration in a transaction involving
maritime matters or interstate commerce. Thus it was applicable, even though the suit
was based on diversity rather than some other basis of jurisdiction. Metro Industrial
Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
817 (1961); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). The Supreme
Court has not yet passed on this question. See an excellent discussion of the problem in
Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section Two of the United States Arbitration Act, 69 Yale
L.J. 847 (1960).
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affected by the decision as to whether to order arbitration, the court
emphasized that a trial before an arbitrator is entirely different from
a trial before a court. There is no jury trial in arbitration proceedings;
arbitrators do not have judicial instruction in the law; they do not
always have to give reasons for the result; and judicial review of
arbitration awards is sharply limited. More significantly, the result
in arbitration proceedings is determined in accordance with commercial
practices, not all of which would be relevant in a court action. The
Bernhardt rationale is equally applicable in a conflicts situation. The
procedural policy of the forum is not involved because nothing takes
place in the forum if arbitration is not ordered. Because the ordering
of arbitration can significantly affect the outcome, the forum should
not do so when the locus would not.
The next question is the effect of a failure to arbitrate as a bar
to an action on the contract. The time has passed when arbitration
agreements were considered illegal because they ousted courts of
jurisdiction. However, some courts will still disregard the agreement
to arbitrate and will entertain an action on the contract. Other courts
hold that failure to arbitrate is a defense to an action on the contract.
If an action would be barred at the locus because of failure to arbi-
trate, it should not be entertained at the forum. Thus, in Miller v.
American Ins. Co. 5 the court held that the forum had no legitimate
interest in entertaining such an action because the contract was made
and was to be performed elsewhere. The court was concerned with
the protection of its residents who had refused to submit to arbitra-
tion. The fact that a forum is hostile to agreements which oust courts
of jurisdiction should assume no importance when the case is being
heard only as a convenience. No procedural policy of the forum can
be affected by the forum's refusal to hear the case. This fact is
ignored by courts which continue to allow actions which could not be
maintained at the locus because of a failure to arbitrate.s0
Where the action would be barred at the forum but not at the
locus, the forum's policy of avoiding the overcrowding of its courts
may come into play. However, if failure to arbitrate is the sole reason
for refusing to entertain the action, it is difficult to see how this policy
is significantly affected. Where forum policy is not affected, the out-
come should be the same as if the case had been brought at the locus.
In summary, the remedy given is to be determined by the lex Jori
only where the forum does not have the judicial machinery to grant
85. 124 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Ark. 1954) (applying Arkansas law).
86. See, e.g., Electrical Research Prods., Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 417,
171 Atl. 738 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 10S
N.E. 653 (1914).
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the relief sought or where a choice must be made between specific
relief and damages. Where the questions before the court affect the
amount of recovery or determine whether suit can be maintained, the
lex loci should be incorporated unless it conflicts with a strong pro-
cedural policy of the forum.
Pleading
Ordinarily, pleading matters will not materially affect the out-
come. It would seriously interfere with the efficient operation of the
forum's judicial system if the court were required to follow all the
"pleading intricacies" of the locus. 7 This is equally applicable to
cases in the federal courts. For Erie purposes federal law has been
held to govern such questions as whether the complaint states a cause
of action;8" whether the defendant is entitled to a more definite state-
ment;8 9 whether matters must be alleged with particularity; 0 whether
a defense can be raised on a motion to dismiss; 91 whether certain items
are required to be pleaded;92 and whether special interrogatories are
to be submitted to the jury. 3 Thus, the general rule in conflicts that
all matters of pleading are determined by the lex ]ori 4 is ordinarily
sound.
Amendment of pleadings will ordinarily not materially affect
the outcome. Thus, the lex fori determines whether it is permissible to
amend a complaint to seek relief against a defendant as an individual
rather than a representative 5 The only question in such a situation
would be whether the plaintiff should be required to institute another
suit. A different case is presented where the amendment has the effect
of introducing a new cause of action which would be barred by the
statute of limitations if amendment were not permitted. Whether the
amendment relates back to the original date of filing is a question
which materially affects the outcome, for this determines whether
suit can be maintained on the claim. The courts have been split
87. See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 169 (1942).
88. Ramsel v. Ring, 173 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1949). Obviously, state law governs as to
what constitutes a cause of action.
89. Smedley v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 12 F.R.D. 355 (D. Neb. 1991).
90. Sims v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 51 F. Supp. 433 (D. Idaho 1943).
91. Kincheloe v. Farmer, 214 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 920
(1955).
92. Kincheloe v. Farmer, supra note 91; Empresa Agricola Chicarna, Ltda. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
93. Garland v. Lane-Wells Co., 185 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1950); Cohen v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1943).
94. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 592 (1934).
95. Martin v. Talcott, 1 App. Div. 2d 679, 146 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dep't 1955) (mere.).
there was no question of the statute of limitations having run.
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on this issue in the Erie situation. Even though it was not permis-
sible under state law, the court in Barthel v. Stammne permitted
relation back on the ground that the defendant received adequate
notice. Moreover, the court also indicated that when suit was filed
in the federal court, the defendant should have known that amend-
ments would relate back. A contrary result was reached in L. E.
Whitham Constr. Co. v. Renter,7 and Nola Elec. Co. v. Reilly,s
on the ground that the matter materially affected the outcome."
This is the sounder view. It is of no import that a defendant has
actually received notice. Such notice would not bind him in the state
court, and that suit has been brought in the federal court should not
alter this result. The same should be true in the conflicts situation.
If amendment is barred at the locus, it should be barred at the forum.
Otherwise, the forum would be permitting the maintenance of an action
that could not be maintained at the locus. We are proceeding on the
assumption that if suit is barred by the statute of limitations of the
locus, it should also be barred at the forum.1 Amendment should not
be permitted if it is barred under the lex Jori, even though it would
be permitted under the lex loci. The forum's procedural policy regard-
ing the adequacy of notice and the application of the statute of limita-
tions would otherwise be obstructed. The point to be remembered,
though, is that the amendment of pleadings may materially affect the
outcome.
Professor Cook has demonstrated that the form of action that is
employed may materially change the result.10 1 The general rule, how-
ever, is that the form of action is determined by the lex fori.0" Today,
although forms of action have generally been abolished, the theories
supporting the various forms have been retained. These theories may
materially affect the outcome of a case. For example, whether the
injured party may waive a tort and bring an action in assumpsit may
determine the survival of an action103 or the measure of damages to
be applied. °4 There is no way in which the theory of the case can
affect the procedural policy of the forum. Thus, where the theory of
96. 145 F.2d 487 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1944).
97. 105 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1939).
98. 93 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
99. In Freeman v. Bee Mlach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943), it was held that whether
an amendment involving a federal claim could be made to relate back when jurisdiction
was originally founded on diversity, was determined by federal law.
100. This problem is treated in detail in text accompanying notes 146-71 infra.
101. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 173-74 (1942).
102. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 587 (1934).
103. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 176 (1942).
104. See Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929).
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the case materially affects the outcome, the forum should use the
lex loci as a model.
In summary, pleading matters will ordinarily be determined by
the lex Jori. Where they will materially affect the outcome, however,
such matters should be determined with reference to the lex loci, ab-
sent countervailing considerations.
Maintenance of Suit
Real Party in Interest .- Ordinarily, identification of the real
party in interest for purposes of maintaining the suit will not ma-
terially affect the outcome. Thus, whether a partial assignee can proceed
against the debtor is determined by the lex fori.115 The question is
really one of practicability. The basis for the traditional equity rule
permitting a partial assignee to sue was the impossibility of insuring
that all the parties could be joined in the same action. In an interstate
case, where joinder of all parties is difficult to obtain, the forum is in
the best position to determine whether all parties can be joined. For
this reason the law of the forum must govern as to whether a partial
assignee can sue.'0 6
On the other hand, if suit is barred unless brought by certain
parties, the identification of the real party in interest materially affects.
the outcome and should be determined by the lex loci. The best ex-
ample is a suit under a wrongful death statute. 07 In such a case no
action can ever be maintained unless it is brought by the parties
plaintiff designated by statute. In situations in which the identity of
the party plaintiff or party defendant affects the amount of recovery,
questions such as joinder should be determined by the lex loci. Thus,
in Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co.,108 it was held that the plaintiff could
maintain an action against one joint tortfeasor without joining the
other, since under the lex loci each defendant was liable for the full
amount of the injury. Under the lex Jori, each would have been liable
only for his proportionate share, and joinder would have been re-
quired in order to apportion liability. Since the liability issue was
determined with reference to the lex loci, the court also found it
necessary to incorporate the joinder law of the locus in order to give
the plaintiff full recovery.
105. See, e.g., Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 59 S.W,2d 746 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1933).
106. For further examples see the illustrations in Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 588
(1934).
107. See Murray v. New York, 0. & W.R.R., 242 App. Div. 374, 275 N.Y. Supp. 10
(1st Dep't 1934).
108. 52 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1931).
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Impleader.-Two Erie cases demonstrate how impleader can
materially affect the outcome of a case. In Brown v. Cranston,
100
the federal court applied state law, which provided that a joint tort-
feasor could not be made a party defendant on the motion of the
original defendant. Under state law, one joint tortfeasor had no right
to contribution against the others unless he had paid more than his
share of a joint money judgment against them. Therefore, to have
permitted joinder would have materially affected their rights inter se.
For that reason, state law was held to be controlling. In D'Onofrio
Constr. Co. v. Reconstruction Co.,110 joinder was permitted in the
original action, even though it might not have been permissible under
state law. State law recognized a right to contribution among joint
tortfeasors regardless of whether judgment had been recovered against
them. Allowing joinder could in no way affect the right to contribution.
Joinder merely permitted determination of all issues in a single action.
The same approach should be taken by a court in a conflicts case, and
joinder should be permitted only when it is permissible under the lex
loci, or when it does not affect the right to contribution.
Substitution of Parties and Survival of Actions.-Substitution of
parties does not appear to affect the outcome of a suit, assuming that
the action can be continued whether or not the adiministrator is
formally substituted. The only effect would seem to be upon costs,
which are determined by the lex Jori in any event. Therefore, the lcx
fori should govern as to formal substitution of parties."' Obviously,
whether an action survives the death of one of the parties materially
affects the outcome, since it determines whether any recovery can be
had at all. It is well settled that survival is determined by the lex loci.1' -
If the forum is concerned with protecting the estates of its domiciliaries,
it may characterize the issue of survival as one of decedent estate law
and apply the lex domicilii. However, where the court is merely serving
as a forum of convenience, it should not apply its own law to matters
which determine whether there will be recovery. The same reasoning
is applicable to the issue of spousal immunity, since immunity pre-
vents recovery. Although courts are split as to whether this issue is
109. 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943).
110. 255 F.2d 904 (lst Cir. 1958).
111. This is decided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 in the Erie situation. Iovino v. Waterson,
274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 941 (1960).
112. The point has been involved in a number of cases, and the result has been
the same. See Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933); Butcher v. Mfaffeo, 225 F.2d 713
(9th Cir. 1955) (applying Arizona law); Yount v. National Bank, 327 Alich. 342, 42
N.W.2d 110 (1950); Kertson v. Johnson, 18S Blinn. 591, 242 NAV. 329 (1932); Friedman
v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 166 At. 119 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) ; Coster v. Coster, 289
N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
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to be determined by the lex loci delictil or the lex domicilii,114 it is
agreed that it is to be determined with reference to the law of some
locus and not by the lex fori.115
Direct Action Stattes.-A twofold problem exists with respect
to statutes permitting direct action against insurers. One problem arises
when the forum has a direct action statute and the locus does not,
and the forum's statute is applied on the ground that the lex fori
governs as to parties. The other arises when such a statute exists only
at the locus, and the forum is asked to permit suit against the insurer.
It has been recognized in the Erie cases that the matter materially
affects the outcome."" There is great controversy as to the propriety
of allowing the jury to know that a defendant is insured. Whether a
direct action can be maintained may well affect the amount of the
jury's award or the amount which will be taken in settlement. It is
necessary to consider the procedural policy of the forum. A direct ac-
tion statute in the forum may represent a policy designed to prevent
juries from reducing the verdict out of sympathy with the defendant
and to guarantee that judgments will be paid in full by insurers. Con-
versely, the absence of a direct action statute may mean that the
forum considers it highly prejudicial to the insurer to allow the jury
to know that the defendant is insured. These conflicting approaches
have led to a split on this issue. Some courts dealing with the problem
have considered the procedural policy of the forum at length, while
others have not considered it at all.
In Kertson v. Johnson,117 for example, the court applied the direct
action statute of the locus which allowed a suit to be maintained against
the insurer before the cause of action was reduced to judgment."18
113. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
114. Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 NAV.2d 814 (1959),
overruling Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
115. Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955), pointed out that
it was immaterial whether the parties were married at the time of suit or subsequently.
In Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357, 53 A.2d 515 (1947), the court applied the principle
to prohibit suit against the insurer, though the locus authorized a direct action against
him. Since there was no action against the spouse, it predicted that the locus would not
permit one against the insurer. This is quite sound, since one of the purposes of spousal
immunity is to protect the insurer from possible collusion.
116. Few cases have actually discussed the point. See Collins v. American Auto. Ins.
Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed on motion of petitioner, 352
U.S. 802 (1956); Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mich. 1940). In Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954), in holding that diversity need only
exist between the insurer and the plaintiff, the Supreme Court assumed that state law
determined the amenability of the insurer to suit.
117. 185 Minn. 591, 242 NAV. 329 (1932).
118. But in Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d
836 (1946), where the insurance contract had a "no-action" clause, and the locus con-
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There was no discussion of possible conflict with the forum's procedural
policy. In Collins v. Ainerican Auto. Ins. Co.,'" a federal court, after
deciding that the issue was to be determined by state law, predicted
that New York would apply the direct action statute of the locus. The
court recognized that the locus had characterized this issue as pro-
cedural but pointed out that the decision was made for local law
purposes. However, the reason given for reference to the law of the
locus was not that the issue affected the outcome. Rather, the court
stated that the statute created a new cause of action. Moreover, there
were certain defenses that could be asserted by the insurer but not by
the wrongdoer. Since it did not discuss directly the prejudicial aspect
of disclosure of insurance coverage to the jury, the court dearly did
not consider New York's procedural policy.
A New York state court did consider the policy aspect of the
problem in Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co.- It conceded that the
statute was "substantive" for conflicts purposes because of its effect
upon the outcome, but said that New York's "public policy"' precluded
enforcement.' 2 The court did not emphasize New York's procedural
policy. The claim itself would not violate public policy in the sense
in which the concept has traditionally been employed by the New York
courts.m Apparently the court was actually concerned with Nem
York's policy against permitting the jury to be informed as to in-
surance coverage. The procedural policy of the forum was partially
recognized by the Supreme Court of Texas in Penny v. Powell."
There the court refused to enforce the direct action statute of the
strued the statute as not authorizing a direct action against the insurer until the claim
against the insured had been reduced to judgment, the forum would not permit the action
until such time. However, an amendment to the statute of the locus did permit joinder.
The court held the amendment inapplicable on the ground that the locus had construed
the amendment as "procedural" in a case involving an issue of local law. See also Lund-
blad v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 265 Mlass. 158, 163 NXE. 874 (1928), permitting a
direct action against the insurer after the claim against the insured had been reduced
to judgment, which was the practice under the lex loci, though under the lex fori, the
plaintiff would have had to bring a suit for equitable relief against both. This would
-materially affect the outcome if service could not be had against the insured in the
forum, so the result is sound.
119. 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed on motion of petitioner, 352
-US. 802 (1956).
120. 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524 (2d flep't 1955), alpd, 4 N.Y.2d 488, 151
1"T..2d 881, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1958).
121. An alternative ground, that in Louisiana suit had to be brought in specified
parishes, is fallacious, as venue requirements of the locus have never been thought to
prevent the action's being a transitory one. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George,
233 U.S. 354 (1914).
122. See the test enunciated in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110-11, 120
N.E. 198, 201 (1918).
123. 347 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1961).
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locus, emphasizing the fact that the forum's procedural rules expressly
prohibited the joinder of insurer and insured in tort cases, though ap-
parently not in contract cases. By prohibiting joinder, the forum had
decided that it considered the question to be determined by the lex ori.
While noting that the forum had construed the statute as procedural,
the court failed to take into account that the characterization had
been made local law rather than conflicts situations.
In Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co.12 4 the court refused to
use the locus' direct action statute as a model and expressly declined to
say whether the question was one of substance or procedure. The court
declared that if the question were one of substance, public policy con-
siderations would preclude maintenance of the suit. More significantly,
the court emphasized the forum's statute prohibiting suit against the
insurer and any reference to insurance during the trial. The forum's
fear that the plaintiff would obtain an excessive and unjust verdict
was noted. The statute was construed as protecting all insurers who
were before the forum. Another approach has been simply to charac-
terize the statute as procedural on the ground that the locus has done
so. 2 5 This approach fails to take into account the fact that cases relied
upon have made the substance-procedure distinction solely for local law
purposes.
So much for the problem of deciding whether to apply the direct
action statute of the locus. The converse problem-whether to apply
the forum's direct action statute to foreign cases-has not been liti-
gated to any great extent. The only case which apparently exists on
the subject, Weingartner v. Fidelity Mitt. Ins. Co.,12 held that
Louisiana's statute was limited to accidents occurring there. The court
stated that the matter was one of substance, and that no suit could
be maintained since there was no authorizing statute at the locus.
It is submitted that the approach taken in Weingartner is the
proper one and that the question should be answered with reference
to the lex loci. Although it is the forum's responsibility to insure fair-
ness, states can and do differ on the issue of whether fairness can be
best achieved by permitting or prohibiting suit against the insurer.
Courts tend to make a fetish of the issue of insurance coverage. The
matter does materially affect the outcome, and it must be remembered
that the forum is but one of convenience. In other words, where states
124. 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946).
125. McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 665, 186 So. 305 (1939). The case
was reaffirmed in Cook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Miss. 371, 128 So. 2d 363, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961).
126. 205 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953).
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differ as to the question of unfairness, and there are valid arguments
on both sides, the procedural policy involved should not be deemed a
strong one. In addition to the question of the size of the verdict, it must
be remembered that a direct action statute seeks to give the plaintiff
greater rights against the insurer. Therefore, the forum should deter-
mine the question of a direct action with reference to the lex loci.
Conditions Precedent to Suit.-The same two-fold aspect is pre-
sented in cases involving conditions precedent to suit. One such situa-
tion involves the question of whether a stockholder can maintain
an action against a corporation without complying with a condition
imposed by the lex loci, which is generally the state of incorporation.
In Hausman v. Buckley,- 7 the law of the state of incorporation per-
mitted a stockholder derivative suit only if the plaintiff had the ap-
proval of a majority of the stockholders. There was no such require-
ment at the forum. The court observed that this rule reflected a policy
-of the locus that such a suit should be brought only if a majority of
the stockholders felt that the corporate welfare would be thereby
promoted. The issue, according to the court, was "not just 'who' may
-maintain an action or 'how' it will be brought, but 'if' it will brought." 23
The court drew an analogy to Cohen v. Bcneficial Industrial Loan
Corp.,'29 where it was held that a state statute requiring that a stock-
holder in a derivative suit post security for costs was binding on a
federal court in a diversity case. Such a requirement was said to "con-
dition the stockholder's action." A similar result was reached in
Steinberg v. Hardy,'30 where state law was held to determine the
extent to which an effort to obtain action by the corporation was a
necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of a shareholder's derivative
suit. The result in the Hausman case is sound. The requirement relates
,directly to whether the suit can be maintained. No procedural policy
-of the forum is involved because nothing happens in its courts if it
does not entertain the suit.
If the forum requires derivative suits to have the approval of a
-majority of the shareholders, but the locus does not, it is submitted
that the forum has no legitimate interest in the question. The forum's
rule is not designed to prevent suits merely in order to reduce the
volume of litigation in the forum. Rather, it is a device to protect the
corporation from dissident shareholders. Once the forum has decided
that the law of another state governs the corporation-stockholder rela-
127. 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
128. Id. at 701.
129. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
130. 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950).
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tionship, it has no interest in protecting the corporation. Therefore,
the question should be determined exclusively with reference to the
lex loci.
Another condition which is sometimes placed on the privilege of
bringing a stockholder's derivative suit is the requirement of posting
security for costs. If the law of the forum permits suit without the
posting of security, its procedural policy should yield to the interest
of the locus. The locus, probably the state of incorporation, has deter-
mined to protect its corporations from dissident shareholders who
do not have a sufficient interest in the suit or the corporation to give
security for costs. The state of incorporation wants the shareholder
to show that he is serious. This policy would seem to be entitled to
greater weight than the forum's policy of opening its doors to all.
Again, it is difficult to see how the forum's procedural policy can be
seriously affected if the law of the locus is followed and no suit takes
place.
Even where it requires the posting of security, the forum has
no legitimate interest in protecting the corporation once it decides
that the corporation-stockholder relationship should be governed with
reference to the law of another state. As the Coken case indicates,
the requirement of security for costs can materially affect the outcome;
for many plaintiffs in derivative actions allow suit to be dismissed
rather than post security. Since it materially affects the outcome, and
since the forum has no real interest in it, the matter should be deter-
mined with reference to the lex loci.1"1
Further conflicts problems arise where a corporation is not per-
mitted to sue because of failure to register or failure to comply with
certain other statutes. 132 Again the problem is two-fold: Should the
forum apply its noncompliance statute where it is but a forum of
convenience? And should the forum refuse to entertain an action by
a corporation because of noncompliance with the law of the locus?
The latter question is answered by Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.""
131. Mr. Ailes observed that although security-for-costs requirements frequently
result in the plaintiff's being denied any relief at all, "yet it is doubtful whether the
most extreme 'realist' would assert that such things relate to the substance of a party's
case." Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 392, 409
(1941). The point Mr. Ailes has ignored is that the question is not one of what is
analytically substantive or procedural.
132. Where the transaction sued on involves solely interstate commerce, the forum
cannot, consistently with the negative aspects of the interstate commerce clause, bar suit
on the transaction. Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914). Cf. Union Brokerage
Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1943), where the corporation carried on otler activities In
the state and localized its business there, even though the particular transaction involved
interstate commerce.
133. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
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There it was held that a corporation which could not sue in the state
court because of failure to comply with its laws could not maintain
the action in the federal court in a diversity case. Whether or not a
party can recover was said to affect the outcome in the most material
way possible. As the court observed, "a right which local law creates
but which it does not supply with a remedy is no right at all for
purposes of enforcement in a federal court."134 However, in Allen v.
Alleghany Co., 3" it was held that suit would not be barred in a conflicts
case unless failure to comply made the obligation "void" at the locus.
This ignores the point emphasized in Woods-the outcome in the locus
would still be that the suit cannot be maintained. Since the forum is
hearing the case only as a convenience, the result should be no different
there. Again, no procedural policy of the forum can be affected by dis-
missing the case.
Where the corporation has failed to comply with the forum's
statutory requirements, the suit should be barred even though it could
be maintained under the lex loci. Denial of access to the courts is the
forum's chief means of compelling compliance with its corporation
law. It is immaterial whether the forum is hearing the case as a matter
of convenience; it is immaterial whether the claim arose in the forum
or elsewhere. The point is that the forum will not open its doors to
a noncomplying corporation. The forum is not concerned with what
the locus would do. Failure to comply is a violation of the law of the
forum, not the law of the locus. This problem does not arise under Erie
because there is no federal statute requiring registration or other acts
of compliance as the price of access to the federal courts.10
Another condition for the maintenance of a suit may be a re-
quirement of notice to the other party prior to suit. For example,
it may be required that the defendant in a defamation action be given
the opportunity to retract before the action can be commenced. Again,
this may be a requirement of either the forum or the locus. For Eric
purposes, it is clear that this is determined by state law.13 T The issue
materially affects the outcome; for it determines whether or not suit
can be maintained. Research has disclosed no cases involving such a
requirement of the locus. But the same courts which have held that
134. Id. at 538.
135. 196 U.S. 458 (190S).
136. If a federal statute required registration, this would prevail over state law, as
suning the activities of the corporation affected interstate commerce. By the same
token, I would assume that under its interstate commerce power, Congress could void
such requirements applicable to both the state and federal courts, where the activities of
the corporation affected interstate commerce.
137. Tademy v. Scott, 157 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1946); Anderson v. Hearst Publishing
Co., 120 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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the question is determined by state law for Erie purposes have also
predicted that the state courts would hold that the requirements on
the locus are applicable in a conflicts situation.138
Where the locus has such a requirement and the forum does not,
then the action clearly should be barred. The question of whether suit
can be maintained obviously affects the outcome materially, and no
procedural policy of the forum can be involved, as we have indicated
previously, when nothing happens in its courts. However, the results
in the cases involving application of the forum's requirement are
questionable. In Arp v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,130 the law of the forum
provided that an action for personal injuries could not be maintained
unless notice were given within a year. The court drew an analogy
to statutes of limitation in holding the notice requirement applicable
to a cause of action arising outside the state. This decision can be
sustained only on the grounds that such notice is necessary to enable
the defendant properly to defend the action. In personal injury litiga-
tion freshness of evidence may be short-lived. It may be necessary for
the defendant to know that he is going to be sued so that he can gather
evidence. If this is the basis of the requirement, then it can be said
to represent a strong procedural policy of the forum-the defendant is
adversely affected whether the cause of action arose in the forum or
elsewhere. Since the case will be tried in the forum, the forum must
guarantee to the defendant adequate notice.
This rationale cannot be used to justify the result in a case such
as Shores-Mueller Co. v. Palmer.4 ' That case involved a statute of
the forum which provided for discharge of a surety's liability unless
the creditor sued the principal within thirty days of receiving notice
to do so from the surety. The court held that this statute was ap-
plicable in a conflicts case. There was no question of unfairness to the
surety in permitting suit. The statute merely regulated the relationship
between surety and creditor and provided another ground for discharge.
It is difficult to see how such a statute could be applicable in a case
where the forum has no interest in the suretyship relation.
The same is true of the libel cases involving statutes requiring a
demand for retraction before bringing suit. A statute of this sort is not
138. In Tademy v. Scott, supra note 137, the forum's statute making it a condition
precedent to a libel action that the plaintiff give the publisher notice of the libel and
make a demand for retraction was applicable to libels published elsewhere. In Anderson
v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra note 137, the court reached the same result, saying that
it was against the forum's public policy to permit such recovery without such notice
and demand.
139. 130 Wis. 454, 110 N.W. 386 (1907).
140. 141 Ark. 64, 216 S.W. 295 (1919).
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designed to put the defendant on notice of the impending suit, for he
will be aware of the libelous nature of the publication and will possess
the evidence relating to it. The purpose of such a statute is simply to
enable the defendant to mitigate his damages by a retraction. Thus,
where the forum does not look to its own law to determine the measure
of damages, the statute of the forum should have no relevance. The
libel cases, along with the cases dealing with other conditions precedent,
indicate that the following proposition may be used as a rough general
principle to guide in the solution of the problems raised. Unless the
fulfillment of the condition required by the forum can be said to be
necessary to a fair trial, the question of whether to impose any con-
dition precedent to suit should be determined with reference to the
lex loci; for the matter is one which directly affects the outcome of the
case.
The outcome is also affected by the question of whether the plain-
tiff has split his cause of action or has elected an inconsistent remedy
in a previous suit. This has been recognized in the Eric situation,"'
since it determines whether the second suit can be maintained. This
reasoning is equally applicable in a conflicts situation. Gentry v. Jett
142
involved the question of whether a plaintiff should be permitted to
bring an action against one joint tortfeasor after having recovered
against the other. The court held that this must be determined with
reference to lex loci.143 In a case where suit would be barred at the
forum and not at the locus, the forum's procedural policy against al-
lowing more than one suit would not seem to be so strong as to justify
a departure from the result at the locus.
Whether a prior suit must be instituted before a particular type
of suit can be maintained is not a question for determination by refer-
ence to the lex loci, for it does not affect the ultimate result. Unlike
the previously considered situations where suit was barred, under
these circumstances a suit can eventually be maintained. This issue
was presented in Huntress v. Huntress' Estate.144 There it was held
that the federal court was not bound by the state practice of requiring
that a judgment be obtained and execution returned unsatisfied before
a creditor's bill could be maintained. The section of the Federal Rules
4 5
141. Berger v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1961) ; Gentry v.
Jett, 273 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960).
142. Supra note 141 (applying Oklahoma law).
143. Accord, Coy v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 186 Mo. App. 408, 172 S.W. 446 (1914),
where the first suit was brought in another state and the second in the forum. The cause
of action arose in the forum.
144. 235 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1956).
145. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(b).
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providing for prosecution of two claims in a single action where one
of them can be maintained only after the other is prosecuted to a con-
clusion was regarded as having no material effect upon the outcome.
Thus the sole issue in such a case is one of the time when the suit can
be commenced. This same reasoning is, of course, applicable in a con-
flicts situation. The forum must be free to decide the time at which the
result of a controversy is to be determined.
Time Limitations
Here again, we are looking at two sets of limitations, those of the
forum and those of the locus. If the action is barred by both, either
because the time limitations have run at both places or because the
forum has a borrowing statute,'146 there is no problem. But often the
action is barred by only one.
Statutes of limitation have traditionally been classified as "pro-
cedural." For this reason, the statute of the forum alone is controlling,
and that of the locus is not considered.1 4 7 This is a result of the
peculiarly Anglo-American concept of a "right without a remedy."
Under this theory, some statutes of limitation are held merely to pre-
vent suit upon a claim at the locus. The right continues to exist; only
the remedy has been destroyed. This theory is significant in the con-
flicts situation because it allows a suit which is barred at the locus to
be maintained in another state which has a longer limitation period. 148
Since statutes of limitation only affect the remedy, they have been
construed as "procedural" for conflicts purposes. We may be con-
fronted here with a "prior hatching" situation. Are statutes of limita-
tion "procedural" for conflicts purposes because they destroy only the
remedy and not the right? Or do they destroy only the remedy and not
the right because they are procedural for conflicts purposes?
146. Borrowing statutes provide that the shorter limitation of the locus is to
prevail if the cause of action would be barred there but not at the forum, See Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws § 604, comment b (1934). For a discussion of the operation of
borrowing statutes, see Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960),
vacated and remanded per curiam, 365 U.S. 293, aff'd on rehearing, 290 F.2d 904 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961). The purpose is to prevent forum shopping and
the statute is construed usually as to bar the action if the question is in doubt. Sc
Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N.E.2d 655, appeal dismissed per curiam
for want of federal question, 313 U.S. 549 (1941), where the forum's notion of the
effect of a seal was applied to bar the action under the shorter statute for nonscaled
instruments of the locus, though it was not barred under the statute of the locus relating
to instruments under seal, and the locus considered the instrument sealed.
147. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 603 (1934).
148. It may also have some significance on the question of consideration in contract
law and perhaps some other areas. Still, if the right-remedy distinction were abolished
for conflicts purposes, it is doubtful if it would remain in other areas.
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Professor Lorenzen's criticism of the right-remedy distinction
appears to be unanswerable. He observed that: "A right which can
be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of its most valuable
attribute. After the enforcement of the right of action is gone under
the law governing the rights of the parties, it would seem clear upon
principle that the same consequences should attach to the operative
facts everywhere."' 49
In accepting as dogma the theory that some statutes of limitation
only destroy the remedy, the important question as to why this is so
has gone unanswered. This is largely because the theory is itself often
justified by pointing to the fact that a suit which has been barred can
still be maintained in another forum with a longer statute of limita-
tions. It has never been satisfactorily shown why a suit should be
permitted if it cannot be maintained under the law to which the forum
looks as a model.150 A proper inquiry must be directed beyond the
right-remedy theory.
A close analysis will indicate that more than one question is
involved in such an inquiry. Attention must first be given to whether
suit is barred by the statute of the forum or the statute of the locus.
If suit is barred at the forum, then it must be barred irrespective of
its status at the locus. The statute of limitations represents the forum's
strong procedural policy against stale evidence. It is better that the
plaintiff should suffer because of his delay than that a suit should be
brought in the forum's courts under conditions which its legislature
has determined are inimical to a proper trial.151 The forum's strong
procedural policy is based upon a desire to prohibit stale evidence
rather than upon the statute of repose aspect of time limitations. 11-2
This has long been recognized. The forum does not violate the full faith
and credit clause by refusing to enforce a judgment on the ground that
149. Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the Conffict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J.
492, 496 (1919).
150. For the view that the matter is determined solely with reference to the lex fo,
see Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 474 (1933).
The author accepts without question the soundness of the right-remedy distinction.
151. It should be noted that there are exceptions to the statute which will protect a
plaintiff with a legitimate reason for delay. The fact that the line must be an arbitrary
one is necessary whenever a limitation based on time is involved. For example, a girl
is no more or less capable of consenting to intercourse the day before or the day after
the line of the age of consent.
152. In Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868), the United
States Supreme Court had occasion to consider the nature of statutes of limitation. Al-
though the Court spoke of them as statutes of repose, the Court indicated that the
statutes really rested on a fear of stale evidence and a desire to protect parties from
"the prosecution of stale claims, when, by loss of evidence from death of some witnesses,
and the imperfect recollection of others, or the destruction of documents, it might be
impossible to establish the truth." Id. at 390.
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it is barred by the forum's statute of limitations. 1 3 The lex fori deter-
mines all aspects of the statute of limitations question, including what
acts are sufficient to toll the statute. 4 Since the forum is interpreting
its own statute of limitations, there is no occasion to look to the lex loci
as a model except to determine the time at which the cause of action
arose.
155
The problem arises where the action is barred by the statute of
limitations of the locus and suit is sought to be maintained at the
forum, which has a longer limitation period. As stated previously, the
question cannot occur if the forum has a borrowing statute since
the shorter statute of the locus will prevent suit.50 Borrowing statutes
represent a legislative policy against forum shopping. The legislature
has decided not to permit the forum's courts to be used to enforce a
claim barred under the law which is to serve the forum as a model.
In the absence of a borrowing statute, the traditional view is that
the action will be barred only if the locus has decided that its particu-
lar statute of limitations destroys the right as well as the remedy.
The struggles of the courts to determine whether the locus has de-
stroyed the right are amusing, even if the results are inconsistent and
the reasoning at times most specious.
It was early recognized that statutes barring an action to recover
property are statutes of prescription which destroy the title of the
rightful owner by lapse of time. This is a matter of practical necessity
designed primarily to protect titles of subsequent purchasers. So too, a
statute of the domicile of a decedent which bars claims against the
estate unless presented within a certain time has been held to destroy
the right." 7 Again this is a rule of necessity designed to permit the final
closing of the estate.'5 s
Wrongful death statutes of limitation have often been held to de-
153. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 311 (1839). See also Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), holding it was immaterial that the statute of tie
locus involved a right "unknown to the common law."
154. See Waterman v. Powell, 66 F.2d 80 (Sth Cir. 1933) (institution of suit that
was subsequently dismissed on procedural grounds); Knight v. Moline, ElM. & W. Ry.,
160 Iowa 160, 140 N.W. 839 (1923) (filing of pleadings which were subsequently
amended).
155. Of course, the time that the cause of action arose is determined by the lox loci.
The forum's statute begins to run from that date. See Hutto v. Benson, 212 F.2d 349
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 831 (1954).
156. See note 146 supra.
157. Harrison v. Stacy, 6 Rob. 15 (La. 1843).
158. See Lamberton v. Grant, 94 Me. 508, 48 Aft. 127 (1901), holding that the time
limitation upon enforcement of a judgment imposed by the state of rendition destroyed
the judgment upon expiration.
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stroy the right,159 perhaps because they involve "rights unknown to
the common law. '160 On the other hand, it has been held that the
legislature has not determined that the right should be destroyed
where the limitation period is not contained within the wrongful death
statute itself. 161 In the recent case of Baldwin v. Brown,1' 2 however, a
Canadian statute of limitations for personal injuries was held not to
destroy the right, even though the limitation was contained in the
same statute as that imposing liability. The court emphasized the
fact that Ontario had no interest in barring the action because all
parties were residents of the forum. This reasoning would be sound
except for the court's holding that liability was to be determined
with reference to Ontario law, since it was the locus delicti. In Bour-
nias v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,1 63 the statute of limitations was held
not to destroy the right because the statute establishing the claim and
the limitation was contained in a general labor code, not limited to
claims.
Courts have been equally inconsistent on forums' statutes of
limitation for wrongful death actions. In Lipton v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp.,"' the forum's statute was heldanot to apply to a cause of action
arising outside the state. The court did not consider whether any
procedural policy of the forum was involved. A contrary result was
reached in Rosenzweig v. Heller,"" where the court held that its
statute of limitations for wrongful death barred actions arising else-
where because it destroyed the right by lapse of time.1 6
Consideration must now be given to the situation where the action
159. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 605, comment a (1934).
160. The Supreme Court has held this too tenuous a distinction to form the basis
for a decision under the full faith and credit clause. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 34S
U.S. 514 (1953). See note 153 supra.
161. In re Estate of Daniel, 208 Minn. 420, 294 N.W. 465 (1940).
162. 202 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
163. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
164. 204 Mfisc. 693, 125 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. CL 1953), aff'd mem., 283 App. Div. 769,
128 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 307 N.Y. 775, 121 NX.2d 615 (1954).
16S. 302 Pa. 279, 153 At. 346 (1931).
166. This is the same statute which was before the Supreme Court in Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 513 (1953). See notes 153 and 160 supra. Even where
the statute of the locus admittedly destroys the right, some courts have been reluctant
to give up the right-remedy distinction and have held that the right is destroyed only
if the plaintiff is a resident at the locus during the limitation period. Canadian Pac. Ry. v.
Johnston, 61 Fed. 738 (2d Cir. 1894). Other courts have realized that residence is an
immaterial factor; if the right is extinguished, then the residency of the plaintiff should
have no effect. E.g., Bulger v. Roche, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 35 (1831). See Ailes, Limitation
of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 474, 494 (1933), in which the
author says that the Johnston case was based on the obsolete concept of choses in action
following the person. This problem serves to emphasize the reluctance to abandon the
right-remedy distinction.
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is barred at the locus but not at the forum and where the statute of
the locus does not destroy the "right." A holding that the action is not
barred can only be based upon an acceptance of the right-remedy
distinction. For Erie purposes the matter is clearly determined by
state law. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,10 7 the action was barred
by a state statute of limitations applicable to equitable actions. There
was no corresponding federal statute of limitations for equitable ac-
tions, so under federal law the plaintiff could only be barred by laches.
The United States Supreme Court expressly applied the outcome test.
The applicability of the statute of limitations obviously affected the
outcome, since it determined whether suit could be maintained. In
deciding that the matter was to be determined by state law, the Court
observed: "Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar re-
covery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created
right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences
that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a
diversity case should follow State law."1 8
Use of the right-remedy distinction to permit suit serves no
useful purpose. Moreover, it encourages forum shopping of the worst
sort, since suit is brought at the forum because it is barred in the
very state which is considered by the forum to be so involved with
the claim that its law must be used as a model to determine liability.
Therefore, the forum should not base its decision upon the right-
remedy doctrine. The shorter statute of limitations of the locus should
be applied simply because the matter materially affects the outcome
of the case. No procedural policy of the forum is violated if the suit
is refused. The absence of a borrowing statute should not prevent ap-
plication of the statute of the locus; for a policy against forum shop-
ping can be set out by the judiciary as well as by the legislature."'0
The outcome test should also be applicable to the doctrine of
laches when equitable relief is sought."' ° Under the Erie line of cases,
167. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
168. Id. at 110. The reasoning is, of course, inapplicable to the forum's own statute
of limitations, as indicated by the preceding discussion.
169. The proposed use of the outcome test, which was suggested in Lorenzen, The
Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919), may be
thought of as an application of the principle of forum non convenjens. The forum would
not be acting as a forum of convenience if the result in the case were different from
that which would be reached at the locus. However, in Running v. Southwest Freight
Lines, Inc., 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578 (1957), the court reversed a lower court's refusal
to entertain a suit on the ground of forum non conveniens and observed that It was not
proper to consider the fact that the statute of limitations had run at the locus.
170. Laches consists of an unreasonable delay in prosecuting a suit which results In
prejudice to the defendant because of lapse of time. Both unreasonable delay and
prejudice must be present. See Shell v. Strong, 151 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1945).
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the question is held to be determined by state law because of the
effect upon the outcome. Whether the plaintiff has been guilty of
laches determines the availability of specific relief. As to that relief
laches operates in the same way as a statute of limitations.17 1 If re-
covery would be barred by laches at the forum, then it should be denied.
The forum must decide whether it will give the remedy of specific
relief, and it must not do so if it considers the remedy improper be-
cause of the lapse of time and the resulting prejudice. Specific relief
should also be denied at the forum if it would be denied at the locus.
Even though the locus would permit the action, relief should still be
denied, since the forum's procedural policy is in no way affected by
refusing to entertain a suit.
The Statute of Frauds
The question of the statute of frauds in the conflict of laws is
most intriguing. It may arise in the following situations: (1) 'Where
the transaction satisfies the statute of frauds of the locus but not that
of the forum. In such a case the question is whether the forum's statute
will be characterized as "procedural." If so, it applies to all suits
brought in the forum irrespective of the law of the state to which the
forum looks to find a model to use in determining substantive liability.
(2) Where the transaction satisfies the statute of the forum, but not
that of the locus. The question presented in this situation is whether
the statute of the locus will be characterized as "substantive," thus
barring the suit. (3) Where the transaction satisfies the statute of
frauds of neither the forum nor the locus. Logically, neither statute
should be a bar if the statute of the forum is characterized as "sub-
stantive" and that of the locus as "procedural."
A number of solutions traditionally have been employed or sug-
gested. One is to treat the question as one of "procedure" in all cases
with validity vel non determined solely with reference to the lex Jori.
Thus, in Fimian v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.," 2 it was stated that the statute
of frauds relates to the "remedy" and is to be determined without refer-
ence to the lex loci. Another approach is to treat the question as one of
"substance," with validity vel nwonM determined solely by the lex loci.
171. See Becbler v. Kaye, 222 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1955), cerL denied, 350 US. 837
(1955); Lassiter v. Powell, 164 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1947), cerL denied, 333 U.S. 845
(1948).
172. 209 Ga. 113, 70 S.E.2d 762 (1952).
173. This approach has been followed both in cases where there was no compliance
with the statute of frauds under the lex loci, Castorri v. Afilbrand, 118 So. 2d 563 (Fla.
DisL Ct. App. 1960), and where there was such compliance, Lams v. F. H. Smith Co.,
36 DeL (6 W.W. Harr.) 477, 178 Adt. 651 (Super. CL 1935); Jackson v. Jackson, 122
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Finally, it has been suggested that the statute of frauds may be both
"substantive" and "procedural." This theory requires that there be
compliance with both the statute of the forum and that of the locus.
Another approach is the rule adopted in Leroux v. Brown,174
which made the result depend upon the wording of the statute. The
fourth section of the English statute of frauds contained the words,
"no contract shall be allowed to be good." This section was held to be
procedural because of its wording, and thus was simply a bar to ac-
tions based upon contracts which did not comply with it. The seven-
teenth section, on the other hand, was held to be substantive. In-
stead of just barring suits it rendered void all noncomplying contracts.
Thus, courts viewing their statutes as substantive will not apply them
to contract actions based upon agreements made in other jurisdictions,
while courts following the procedural interpretation will do so. More-
over, courts following the word test approach apply the test to the
statutes of both the forum and the locus, unless there has been a
contrary decision by the courts of the locus. Thus, if the statute of the
forum reads "the contract is void" and that of the locus reads "no
action shall be brought," the result can be enforcement of a contract
which satisfies neither provision. 5
An interesting case refusing to approach the statute of frauds
question as one of substance or procedure170 is Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. Stephenson.1 77 Suit was brought in Alaska on an oral contract of
employment which had been made in New York. Performance of the
contract was to be almost entirely in Alaska. The court held that
Alaska's statute of limitations was applicable, but said that it would
have applied the New York statute if the courts of that state had
clearly declared it to be substantive. Noting that the New York statute
Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953); D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co., 155 Wis.
541, 145 N.V. 372 (1914).
174. 12 C.B. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (C.P. 1852).
175. See Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883). The case
is an excellent example of mechanical jurisprudence-logic is followed without question-
ing the soundness of the premise or the ultimate result.
176. The "substance and procedure" distinction has been disregarded in some cases.
One court has taken the position that the enforcement of a statute not complying with
its statute of frauds would be against public policy. Barbour v. Campbell, 101 Kan, 616,
168 Pac. 879 (1917). Contracts to make a will have been dealt with in a particular
fashion. Courts have indicated that because such agreements involve the final disposition
of a party's estate, their validity should not depend upon the choice of forum. Thus,
the result has been held to be determined either by the lex domicilii at death, Emery v.
Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 309 N.Y.
288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953), or by the law of the decedent's domicile at the time and
place of the making of the testamentary contract, Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588,
360 P.2d 906 (1961).
177. 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954).
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had been held to be "primarily procedural and perhaps substantive,
too,"' 7 and that New York seemed "to rely on the center of gravity
theory of the contract,' 17 the court in Alaska Airlines relied on the
fact that Alaskan law would have been applied had suit been brought
in New York. The court's reasoning is confusing. It is clear that the
court did not hold merely that the question was determined by the
lex Jori. This may have been a renvoi case in which the court looked to
New York and then applied New York's conflicts rules to look to
Alaska. A simpler method would have been to characterize Alaska as
the locus because the contract was to be performed there and to deter-
mine the question with reference to the lex loci.
Commentators have advanced various views as to the solution
of the statute of frauds problem. Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested
that, realistically speaking, most courts will enforce a contract if it
satisfies either the statute of the locus or that of the forum. 8 0 The
only condition which Ehrenzweig places upon this approach is that
the forum have sufficient contacts to constitutionally apply its statute,
thus avoiding forum shopping where the court acts as a forum of con-
venience. Professor Lorenzen has reached substantially the same
result.' He advocates that the matter be determined with reference
to the lex loci except in international transactions where the contract
should be upheld if it satisfies the lex fori.1 2
These conflicting approaches and suggestions can be profitably
disdussed only when one realizes that there are two statutes involved,
rather than one. It is important to look first at the situation where
there is no compliance with the forum's statute. Often courts treat the
question as one of statutory construction. The Restatement has fol-
lowed this approach. 8 3 This is particularly true when the court is
committed to a Leroux v. Brown approach.184 First the question is
178. Id. at 297-98.
179. Id. at 298. See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), where the
parties were domiciled in England. The wife continued to live there, but the husband
deserted her and she finaly caught up with him in New York, where they executed a
support agreement. It was held that all matters were governed with reference to English
law.
180. Ehrenzweig, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws: The Basic Rule of
Validation, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 874 (1959).
181. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale Lj. 311,
338 (1923).
182. The reason for the international transaction exception is that the statute of
frauds is an impediment to such transactions, since it is impossible for the parties to
predict in advance where the suit will be brought, or which law will be held to govern.
Lorenzen does not require that the forum have any contact with the transaction in such
a case. Id. at 333.
183. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 598, comment a, 602, comment a (1934).
184. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
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asked whether the legislature of the forum intended to bar suits on all
transactions not in compliance with the forum's statute of frauds. The
Leroux v. Brown courts indicate a method by which such intent can be
ascertained. However, it must be asked whether the legislature was
thinking in terms of the conflict of laws when it enacted the statute.
It should be noted that after the decision in Leroux v. Brown, the
seventeenth section of the statute was amended to read "not enforce-
able."" This demonstrated that the legislative intent was to bar
enforcement of all contracts not in compliance with the forum's
statute. But, is there ordinarily such evidence of legislative intent?
It would seem that the concern of the legislature in enacting the
statute of frauds is primarily to protect parties who are dealing in
that state rather than to establish a procedural rule to be followed
in the courts of the forum."8 6 A state encouraging commercial inter-
course may have a lenient statute, or none at all. A state desiring to
protect its residents against certain transactions will require greater
formality. The legislature is concerned with protecting and affecting
the interests of the parties who transact business within the state
rather than with establishing procedural policy to be followed when
the courts act as a forum of convenience. 8 7
It is well established that the requirement of the statute of
frauds is not a rule of evidence. A case can often satisfy the statute
by means other than a writing. The fact that a memorandum made
after suit has been commenced ordinarily does not satisfy the statute
indicates that it is not an evidentiary rule.188 Much like the parol
evidence rule, the statute of frauds represents a policy requiring writ-
ten proof of the validity of commercial transactions. It is well settled
that the application of the parol evidence rule is determined solely with
reference to the lex loci.8'° In view of these considerations it is sub-
mitted that the statute of frauds should not be deemed to represent a
procedural policy of the forum absent specific language to that effect.
Rather, it should be deemed to establish a policy designed to insure
that contracts governed by the law of the forum should be given
effect only upon compliance with certain conditions.
Once it is decided that the forum's statute is not applicable to
185. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale L.J, 311,
313 (1923).
186. See discussion of this point in Lares v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. (6 W.W. Harr.)
477, 482, 178 Atl. 651, 654 (Super. Ct. 1935).
187. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 149 (2d ed. 1951).
188. See Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale L.J. 311,
324-28 (1923).
189. Kirtley v. Abrams, 299 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962) (applying New York law);
Baxter Nat'l Bank v. Talbot, 154 Mass. 213, 28 N.E. 163 (1891).
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transactions whose validity is determined with reference to the law of
another state, the interpretation which has been given the statute of
the locus is of no concern to the forum. It must be remembered that
the forum is applying its own law. Because it is a forum of con-
venience, the court of the forum should attempt to insure the same
result which would be reached at the locus. The statute of frauds
materially affects the outcome of a case, for it determines whether
suit can be maintained on the contract at all. It has never been dis-
puted that the statute of frauds question is to be determined by state
law for Erie purposes.190 No procedural policy of the forum is involved.
As indicated, the statute does not set forth a rule of evidence. More-
over, the theory of the statute is not that it is unfair to enforce an oral
contract, but that oral contracts in certain cases should not be suf-
ficient to create contractual interests unless the parties show they are
sufficiently serious to make a memorandum or do other acts. There-
fore, where the contract satisfies the statute of the locus, there is no
reason why it should not be enforced in the forum, and vice versa.
The view that a contract which complies with the lcx Jori, but
not the lex loci, should be enforced if there are sufficient contacts10I
or if the contract involves an international transaction, -10 2 represents a
distaste for the statute of frauds. Proponents of this view would seize
upon the validity of the transaction at the forum to avoid the bar at the
locus. Distaste for the statute of frauds is not a relevant factor once
the forum has decided that the result should be the same as if suit had
been brought at the locus. This is true whether the transaction is valid
or void under the statute of the locus. When it incorporates the law of
another state, the forum decides that it has no interest in the soundness
of the law which it incorporates. For this reason, all questions as to the
statute of frauds should be determined with reference to the lex loci.
Burden of Proof
At the outset, a distinction must be drawn between the two aspects
of the burden of proof. On the one hand is the risk of nonproduction.
This is a shifting burden requiring that a party produce some evidence
or suffer a nonsuit. When a party has done so, the burden shifts to
the other party to produce evidence sufficient to take the case to the
jury. When both parties have produced such evidence, the risk of
nonproduction comes to an end. The other aspect is the risk of non-
190. The point was discussed briefly in Macias v. Klein, 203 F.2d 205 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953). The court observed how it would "significantly affect.
the result of the litigation." 203 F.2d at 207.
191. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
192. See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
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persuasion. This remains constant and is relevant when the case
reaches the trier of fact. If the mind of the trier of fact remains in
equilibrium, he is to decide against the party having the risk of non-
persuasion.193
Since the question of who has the risk of nonproduction will not
materially affect the outcome if the evidence is readily available, the
lex Jori should govern. As Professor Stumberg has pointed out, this
burden merely "affects the order in which the plaintiff or defendant
presents his side of the case.1 194 Where it is likely that proof will be
unavailable, though, there will generally be a presumption or an
inference. These problems are taken up individually.'"
As to the risk of nonpersuasion, which may now be called the
burden of proof, the traditional view is that it is determined by the
lex fori unless it has been interpreted by the locus as a "condition of
the cause of action."' 96 The problem which thus arises is similar to
that encountered with regard to the "substantive statute of limitations."
Did the locus entwine the cause of action with the burden of proof?
The issue has arisen most frequently in cases involving the burden
of proof as to contributory negligence. This burden is ordinarily on
the defendant, since he is alleging the existence of contributory negli-
gence; but some states have held that the plaintiff has the burden
of showing that he is free from fault. In Reddick v. M. B. Thomas
Auto Sales,97 the court overruled prior cases and held that it would
apply the rule of the locus which placed the burden of proof upon the
plaintiff, rather than the traditional burden of proof rule of the forum.
The court said that meeting the burden was a condition to the plain-
tiff's cause of action and thus was no different from the requirement
that he show the defendant to have been negligent, a requirement
which is clearly determined with reference to the lex loci."0 s In Pre-
court v. Driscoll,'" the court reached the same result but based its
decision upon a different theory, observing that it was necessary to
bring over the remedy of the locus in order to "preserve the integrity
and character" of the cause of action. 200 Also important to that de-
193. See Stumberg, supra note 187, at 156, and Morgan, Choice of Law Governing
Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 180 (1944), for discussions of this distinction.
194. Sturnberg, supra note 187, at 156.
195. See text accompanying notes 213-41 infra.
196. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 595, comment a (1934).
197. 364 Mo. 1174, 273 SAV.2d 228 (1954).
198. See Spencer v. Bright, 159 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Ky. 1958) (applying Kentucky
law).
199. 85 N.H. 280, 157 Atl. 525 (1931).
200. Id. at 283, 157 Ati. at 527.
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cision was a finding that no policy of the forum would be adversely
affected.2 01
Other courts have held that questions of burden of proof are
determined solely with reference to the lex Jori whether or not the
burden of proof is "inseparably bound" to the cause of action. - How-
ever, a court following this approach did hold that the burden was
to be determined with reference to the lex loci in a case where the
statute of the locus established a rule of comparative negligence. 3
The rationale for the decision was that comparative negligence involves
a right unknown to the common law.204 In State Mut. Life Assur. Co.
v. Wittenberg, 0 5 the court held that the burden of proof on the issue
of whether a worker was regularly employed within the meaning of
a group life insurance policy was not "inseparably woven into the cause
of action so that to divorce the remedy from the right would defeat the
cause of action, 2 0 6 and applied the forum's burden of proof.
The position that the law of the locus will apply only if the
burden of proof is "inseparably bound up" with the cause of action
has been criticized primarily on the ground that it does not supply
a test which can be employed with any degree of precision. The Re-
statement expounds the position, but supplies no criteria for deter-
mining whether the matters are inseparably connected.'$ Judge
Magruder, in commenting on section 595 of the Restatement, has ob-
served:
But to say it is a condition of the cause of action seems to be
merely another way of saying that the plaintiff has the burden of proof;
for if this burden is upon the plaintiff, his recovery is necessarily con-
ditioned upon his convincing the jury of his freedom from contributory
fault.... A similar verbal twist could be used to show that a rule putting
the burden on the defendant is a matter of substance. It can be said that
where a defendant has negligently caused harm, the requirement that he
must affirmatively establish the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a
"condition" of his defense. But putting it this way really proves
nothing. 08
201. Id. at 282, 157 At. at 526.
202. Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919); Wright v. Palmison, 237
App. Div. 22, 260 N.Y. Supp. 812 (2d Dep't 1932).
203. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929).
204. This approach is much the same as that taken in cases involving the statute of
limitations on wrongful death actions. See notes 159-65 supra and accompanying text.
205. 239 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1956) (applying Arkansas law).
206. Id. at 90.
207. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 595, comment a (1934).
208. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 755 n.2 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940).
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It appears to the writer that a court means only that allocation
of the burden of proof is more likely to affect the outcome of the case
when it concludes that the burden of proof is a "condition to the cause
of action." Because of the effect upon the outcome, the court will say
that the issue is determined with reference to the lex loci, or, in tra-
ditional terms, that it is "substantive." Since the question of liability
is likely to be a close one in cases of negligence and contributory negli-
gence the court is apt to recognize that the burden of proof makes a
real difference. However, in every case there is the possibility that the
trier of fact will reach a state of equilibrium. The burden of proof
materially affects the outcome, since it determines who prevails when
such a deadlock occurs. With this in mind, it may be seen that whether
the burden of proof is a "part of the cause of action" or is applicable
to a "right unknown to the common law" is irrelevant.
It has been recognized that the burden of proof is determined by
state law for Erie purposes. In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 00
the Court held that the burden of proof on the issue of bona fide pur-
chaser for value represented a "substantial right upon which the
holder of recorded legal title to . . . land may confidently rely." In
Palmer v. Hoffman,210 the Court held that the burden of proof as to
contributory negligence was determined by state law. After the enuncia-
tion of the outcome test in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 21' there is no
doubt that the burden of proof as to all aspects is determined by state
law. This is equally applicable to the degree of proof, for example,
where there is substantial evidence to prove a contract in an action for
specific performance. 12
The outcome is affected to the same extent in the conflicts situa-
tion. Again, the forum is not concerned with whether the locus charac-
terizes the question of burden of proof as one of "substance" or "pro-
cedure." The forum is applying its own law and will use that of the
locus as a model when it materially affects the outcome. There is also
no procedural policy of the forum that is adversely affected if the
locus' burden of proof rule is used as a model. There is nothing funda-
mentally unfair about allocating the risk of nonpersuasion to one party
or the other. Because of its material effect upon the outcome when the
mind of the trier of fact is in equilibrium the question of the burden
of proof should be determined in all cases with respect to the lex loci.
209. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
210. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
211. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
212. Johnson v. Mosley, 179 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1950).
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Presumptions
A true presumption is a rule that when certain facts have been
proven, other facts are presumed to exist unless rebutted by the party
against whom the presumption runs.213 It should be noted that a
presumption shifts the risk of nonproduction to the party against whom
the presumption runs. It is likely that he will also bear the risk of non-
persuasion if the trier of fact cannot decide if the evidence introduced
is sufficient to rebut the presumption.
The problem encountered in determining whether the forum
should apply its own presumptions in a conflicts case or bring over
the presumptions of the locus is complicated by the fact that presump-
tions are of different weights and have different purposes. Some, like
the presumption of innocence in a civil action, merely require a
party to come forward with evidence. Other presumptions, like the
reply doctrine, relate purely to questions of evidence. A presumption
may represent a strong social policy of the forum, as is the case with
the presumption of legitimacy. Others may represent an attempt to
permit a party to get to the jury where the evidence to support his
claim is not of a type which is likely to be available to him.
Some presumptions have a rational basis. The presumption against
suicide is based on our experience that the great mass of persons who
die, even of nonnatural causes, do not take their own lives. On the
other hand, the presumption that an employer is guilty of negligence
and his employee free from fault if an accident occurs during the course
of employment is not necessarily in accord with human experience. -2 14
Analytically, presumptions relate to evidence, because they permit
a party to go to the jury even when he cannot produce evidence of a
necessary fact. Therefore, the conventional approach is that questions
of presumption are to be determined exclusively by the lex for. -15
This approach is sound only where the presumption operates merely
213. "Conclusive presumption" is a misnomer. Since such a presumption cannot be
rebutted, it is no different from any other rule of law. A presumption is distinguishable
from an inference because the trier must presume Fact B when Fact A has been proved.
In the case of an inference the trier may presume Fact B, but is not required to do so.
See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 177-79 (1942), for a
discussion of the operation of presumptions. This distinction is not important for our
purposes, and both inferences and presumptions will be treated under the generic term,
"presumptions."
214. Rather than solve the problem in this manner, states have adopted workmen's
compensation statutes.
215. See, e.g., Sloniger v. Enterline, 400 Pa. 457, 162 A.2d 397 (1960), where the
court observed that the only presumptions applicable were those of the forum. Section
595(2) of the Restatement adopts this approach.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1962]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to shift the burden of producing evidence. In Broderick v. McGuire21
a statute of the locus made a certificate of the superintendent of banks
as to his determination of a bank's insolvency presumptive evidence
of the facts stated in the certificate. The presumption was held to be
inapplicable in an action in another state to enforce a statutory assess-
ment against the stockholders. The court said that the presumption
was not "so much of the substance of the right that . [it] should
be given effect" extraterritorially' 17 Since the records of the bank's
assets and liabilities could be subpoenaed, the refusal to apply the
presumption did not materially affect the outcome. It is no different
from any other risk of nonproduction situation where the evidence
is obtainable. 18
At the other end of the spectrum are certain matters clearly ac-
cepted as rules of substantive law for all purposes which take the
form of presumptions. For example, the resulting trust is really a
presumption: If land is conveyed to A, but the purchase is paid by B,
who has no close relationship to A, we say that A holds in trust for B
unless A rebuts the presumption of a trust and shows that B actually
intended the land to be held by A as a gift. 1 In terms of technique a
resulting trust is no different from any other presumption, as the
presumed fact can be rebutted by a showing of other facts.
The traditional approach is unsatisfactory because it fails to
recognize that a presumption often is intended to achieve a favorable
result for one party or at least enable him to get to the jury, except
in those rare cases where the other party can show that he should
not be liable in a particular situation. For Erie purposes the effect of
a presumption on the outcome has been clearly recognized. Thus, in
Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.,2"0 it was assumed by both parties
that the presumption against suicide was substantive for Erie purposes.
The court also observed that presumptions, like the burden of proof,
have a material effect on the outcome. 2 ' The effect of presumptions on
the outcome has been recognized in a number of other cases involving
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur22
There is no doubt that a rule of the locus imposing absolute
216. 119 Conn. 83, 174 Adt. 314 (1934).
217. Id. at 102, 174 AUt. at 322.
218. See Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 192-93
(1944).
219. See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 179 (1942).
220. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
221. The same approach was recognized earlier in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Boone, 236
F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956).
222. Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 162 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1947); Sicrocinski v. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1941).
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liability would be taken as a model, absent a public policy objection.
The result should be no different where the locus uses the device of a
presumption which has the effect of imposing absolute liability in the
great majority of cases, while allowing the defendant to show in certain
cases that he really should not be liable. This type of presumption was
presented to the court in Buhler v. Maddison.2- 3 A statute of the lex
loci delictl provided that there should be a presumption that any in-
jury to an employee was proximately caused by the negligence of the
employer if he had not accepted coverage under the state workmen's
compensation act. In a personal injury action the forum applied the
statutory presumption on the theory that the presumption was an
integral part of the cause of action. The court's holding, if not its
reasoning, is entirely correct. The statute was clearly an attempt to
place employees of a rejecting employer on a par with those of an
accepting one. The decision whether to give effect to the presumption
clearly had a material effect upon the outcome, since the injured em-
ployee would be unlikely to possess evidence of negligence in many
cases.
Many presumptions fall into this category. Where the presumption
has been set forth in a statute, there is no difficulty in determining
its effect 24 In passing the statute involved in Buhler, the legisla-
ture stopped short of imposing absolute liability. However, it imposed
upon the defendant the duty of showing a clear absence of liability in
cases where all the evidence was likely to be in his hands, or where
no evidence existed at all. The difference in effect between this statute
and one which imposes absolute liability is very slight. Yet there are
cases like Southern Ry. v. Robertson,22 in which the court held that
a rebuttable presumption of negligence running in favor of a railroad
employee injured in the course of his employment should be determined
by the lex fori because the presumption was not an integral part of
the cause of action."
A more realistic approach was taken by the Missouri court in
Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.FR.R 2 27 The case involved a statute of the locus
which, on its face, imposed absolute liability upon a showing that a
person had been injured by a moving train. The statute had been
interpreted merely to create a presumption of negligence. The forum
223. 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118 (1947).
224. See the objections to applying presumptions of the locus because of the diffi-
culty of ascertaiment of the effect of common law presumptions in Morgan, Choice of
Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 192-93 (1944).
225. 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S.E. 535 (1909).
226. Accord, St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Coy, 113 Ark. 265, 168 S.V. 1106 (1914).
227. 308 Mo. 77, 271 SAV. 806 (1925).
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applied the statutory presumption, holding that it created a "sub-
stantial substantive right." The Missouri court, in effect, recognized
that such presumptions are substitutes for absolute liability and are
clearly designed to put the plaintiff in a better position than he would
be absent the presumption. To that extent they materially affect the
outcome.
The same reasoning is applicable where violation of a statute
creates a presumption of negligence, or, to use the more common de-
scription, is prima facie evidence of negligence. There can be no
doubt that a provision of the lex loci to the effect that violation of a
statute constitutes negligence per se would be considered "substan-
tive." The result should be no different because the defendant is given
the opportunity to show that he actually was not negligent despite
the violation. However, this approach was rejected in Harnet v.
Hook,228 where it was held that a statute of the locus providing that
a speeding violation constituted prima facie evidence of negligence was
"procedural" for conflicts purposes. The same result was reached in
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker2 29 A statute of the forum pro-
vided that a showing of the manufacture of a dangerous product and
the absence of warning would give rise to a presumption that the
manufacturer knew of the danger. The statute was held to be pro-
cedural. Both cases relied on section 595 of the Restatement. Both
cases also ignored the fact that such statutes really impose absolute
liability except in the rare situation where the defendant can establish
that he was not negligent. In any event, the statutes at least give the
plaintiff a chance to get to the jury without producing any other evi-
dence.3 °
Presumptions such as these are not necessarily based upon hu-
man experience. They represent attempts to benefit a party who cannot
produce evidence to support his contention. For example, upon the
death of one party to a transaction the other may not be allowed to
prove the transaction. If the locus provides that contributory negli-
gence shall not be a defense in a wrongful death action, the forum
should incorporate the lex loci. The result should be no different where
228. 106 Cal. App. 2d 791, 236 P.2d 196 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
229. 228 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956) (applying
Massachusetts law).
230. See Shepard & Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 246 S.W. 836 (1922), where
the court refused to draw the presumption of the locus that certain actions were indica-
tive of a contract for the sale of futures which were illegal under the lex lod. The matter
was asserted as a defense to the contract. These presumptions were completely out of
accord with any experience and seemed more like an effort to discourage certain prac-
tices. Nonetheless, the effect would have been to bar recovery at the locus, and the
presumptions should have been incorporated by the forum.
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a statute creates a presumption of due care on the part of the decedent.
Yet in Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co.," such a presumption
of due care was held to be "procedural," and the forum's statute was
applied.
The presumption against suicide, which may have a logical base,
also materially affects the outcome. For example, where a person dies
of nonnatural causes, the presumption helps the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy recover even though he cannot prove that death was
not due to suicide. The actual evidence as to the cause of death will
be most difficult to obtain, and the presence or absence of a presump-
tion against suicide will determine whether the locus is attempting to
protect the beneficiary or the insurer. In Pilot Life hIs. Co. v. Boone,' 2
this attempt to protect the beneficiary was recognized as a matter ma-
terially affecting the outcome which was to be determined with
reference to the lex loci.- 3 The court emphasized the relationship of
this presumption to the right to defend under the policy.
The same reasoning applies with respect to the presumption of
payment 34 and the presumption of assent to limitation on liability by
acceptance of a bill of lading containing such limitations. - 5 In such
cases evidence will probably be sharply conflicting. It may be un-
available. Such a presumption can tip the scales in favor of the party
for whose benefit the presumption applies and should be determined
by the lex loci. 11
Res ipsa loquitur has undergone a transformation which should
affect its characterization for conflicts purposes. I must disagree with
Professor Morgan that it operates merely to make the issue of negli-
gence a question for the jury. 37 Even if that were all it did, it still
231. 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941).
232. 236 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying South Carolina law).
233. In the forum the presumption shifted the burden of persuasion; in the locus
it shifted that of production. This is immaterial due to the difficulty of proof.
234. Held to be controlled by the lex lod in Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Palmer,
52 Minn. 174, 53 N.W. 1137 (1893).
235. Held to be controlled by the locus in Hartman v. Louisville & N.R.R., 39 Mo.
App. 88 (1890). There the forum refused to apply this presumption, and none existed
under the lex lod. In Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., 115 Mass. 304 (1874), the
forum did apply such a presumption, saying it involved only a difference in the mode of
proof.
236. As the court observed in Hartman v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 235, at
100-01:
The rule [governed by the lex loci] must of necessity apply to such a con-
tract as the one before us; otherwise we should be involved in the solecism of
holding that a piece of paper containing a stipulation, of no validity in the
place where it was executed and delivered and where the general engagement
evidenced by it was to be chiefly performed, becomes a contract in some other
jurisdiction in which an action may chance to be brought upon it.
237. See Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 177-78
(1944).
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could be contended that this materially affects the outcome. Res ipsa
loquitur is used as a device to impose absolute liability in cases where
the facts cannot be determined. The best example is the applicability
of the doctrine in airplane crashes. It imposes absolute liability except
in those unlikely cases where the defendant can come forward with
evidence showing that he is not at fault. Its relationship to the im-
position of absolute liability is clear, and it has been held to be deter-
mined by state law for Erie purposes.238 However, many courts still
say that since res ipsa loquitur creates only a presumption and not
absolute liability, the question should be determined by the lex Jori.23
These cases represent examples of "mechanical jurisprudence." The
court analyzes the problem in conceptual terms and makes its decision
on that basis without considering the practical effects.
However, in Lachman v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., "40
the court did look to the effect of this presumption and concluded that
the question should be determined with reference to the lex loci. The
court treated the analysis for Erie purposes and conflicts purposes as
co-extensive and said that whether proof of the occurrence of the in-
jury alone will or will not justify a finding of liability on the ground
of negligence materially affects the outcome.21 This reasoning is sound
in light of the obvious effect of res ipsa loquitur.
Even though presumptions clearly affect the outcome unless they
involve the production of evidence readily obtainable, it is necessary
to consider the procedural policy of the forum. Employing the presump-
tion of the locus or failing to employ the forum's presumption cannot
interfere with the efficient operation of the forum's judicial system, but
may involve procedural policy. It may be contended that the existence
of a presumption in the forum indicates its view that fairness demands
that certain types of proof which are difficult to obtain should be
presumed. The answer to this contention is that such a policy is
properly implemented by allocation of the burden of production. A
presumption should not be used to enable a party to prevail without
introducing any evidence. To permit such recovery would not involve
procedural policy, since it is not necessary in order to be "fair" to that
238. Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Lobel v. American
Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
239. See Estepp v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 192 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1951) (applying
Kentucky law); Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying
New York law); Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949); Clodfeltcr
v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11 (1938) (dictum).
240. 160 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1947) (applying Virginia law).
241. See also Matsumoto v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 168 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948) (applying Wisconsin law), where the court held without
discussion that all questions relating to res ipsa loquitur were determined by the lex lod,
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party. Rather it represents a determination that he should recover
absent proof to the contrary. This type of determination should be
made with reference to the law of the state which governs as to the
issue of liability. It is not the forum's province to see to it that a
particular party prevails. Since the forum does not hesitate to enforce
absolute liability in most instances, it should not hesitate to permit en-
forcement of less than absolute liability in the form of presumptions
which favor one party. Giving effect to a presumption does not affect
the fairness of a trial to the extent that the forum should refuse to
incorporate a matter which materially affects the outcome.
In this area, the result should be the same as in the Eric line of
cases. All presumptions except those relating to the production of evi-
dence which is readily available materially affect the outcome and
should be determined with reference to the lex loci.
Evidence
The traditional rule is that matters relating to evidence are deter-
mined by the lex fori.2 " If evidentiary questions are defined as those
involving admissibility, competency, and relevancy, and presumptions
and the burden of proof (risk of nonpersuasion) are eliminated from
its scope, then this rule is sound. Whether a particular piece of evidence
is admitted or not may have no real effect upon the outcome of the
case. Because there is no way of knowing what the jury takes into
account in reaching its decision it is regarded as error to exclude ad-
missible evidence or to admit that which is inadmissible. Even so,
all questions of evidence may not materially affect the outcome. Thus,
a reversal is granted only where the erroneous decision as to the evi-
dence is "prejudicial."
The traditional rule is also sound from a practical point of view.
It is a practical impossibility for the forum to incorporate the entire
body of evidence law of the locus. A judge trying a case must make
evidentiary decisions fairly rapidly if the trial is to proceed with any
dispatch. He cannot adapt to an entirely new system whenever a case
involves a foreign element, discarding responses which may in some
cases be almost automatic.
Finally, matters of evidence reflect a strong procedural policy
of the forum with respect to how a case should be tried. The forum
has its own views as to what evidence is trustworthy, what persons can
be relied upon to tell the truth, what wil improperly influence juries,
and how much control the judge should be permitted to exercise.
These three reasons combine to make a strong argument that
242. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 599-98 (1934).
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the lex Jori should control as to matters of evidence. This is illustrated
by Lynde v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 43 a case involving suit on an
insurance policy. The insured died in a state other than the forum, and
the beneficiaries claimed that the death had been accidental within
the meaning of a double indemnity provision of the policy. The de-
fense was that the insured had committed suicide. The only evidence
of accidental death was a death certificate prepared by the coroner.
This certificate was admissible at the locus, the state where the insured
died and where the policy was issued. The official who had prepared
the death certificate was apparently not a physician, and the physician
who had conducted the autopsy testified that it was impossible to
determine whether or not death had been due to carbon monoxide
poisoning. The court correctly held that the admissibility of the cer-
tificate was determined by the lex fori, and refused to admit it. It is
doubtful whether admitting the certificate would have made any real
difference in the outcome of the case, in view of the testimony of the
physician. Moreover, the layman who had prepared the certificate had
no way of knowing whether death had been caused by carbon monox-
ide poisoning. The certificate merely represented the opinion of one
with doubtful qualifications to render such an opinion. The forum
could well decide that a death certificate prepared by a layman should
not be regarded as trustworthy. Thus, even if this evidence could have
influenced the jury, the court was still correct in its holding. The forum
is responsible for the trial, knows its juries, and should determine
whether they should hear evidence of this sort.
The fact that many evidentiary questions will not materially
affect the outcome of a case, the impracticability of a judge's applying
another system of evidence law, and the forum's interest in reaching
a fair result have all been recognized in the Erie situation. The
emphasis has rightly been upon the lack of outcome effect rather
than upon federal procedural policy. It should be remembered that
under Rule 43 evidence which is admissible in state courts is ad-
missible in federal courts. A problem will arise in the Erie situation
only when the evidence is inadmissible under state law, but admissible
under some other provision of Rule 43. Because of the combination
of practicality and lack of probable effect upon the outcome, questions
such as the scope of cross-examination, 4 admissibility of deposi-
tions, 45 the relative weight of positive, negative, direct and circum-
243. 293 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
244. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
245. Franzen v. E. I. Du Pont de Nernours & Co., 146 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1944).
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stantial evidence, "46 and competency of expert testimony 4 7 are deter-
mined by the Federal Rules rather than by state law.2 48
The result in a case like United States v. Davisi"-1 where state
law was held to govern in a non-Erie situation, is questionable. The
court applied a state rule which provided for the genuineness of an
instrument filed with a pleading unless denied by the opponent's affi-
davit. Such a rule cannot materially affect the outcome, since the
genuineness of a document can be proved in many other ways. More-
over, when testimony is being heard in a federal court, it is being
heard by federal judges who are used to dealing with evidentiary ques-
tions based upon the Federal Rules rather than upon state law. Thus
in Dallas County v. Commercial Union Ass-ur. Co.,2 ° federal rather
than state law was held to determine the question of whether a news-
paper could be admitted into evidence under the ancient document
exception to the hearsay rule. A fortiori, matters of this nature should
be determined by the lex fori in conflicts cases.
On the other hand, there are certain evidentiary questions which
can be answered only by reference to law that is analytically sub-
stantive. An example is whether a statement by an agent is admis-
sible as an admission of the principal where it is claimed that the agent
acted beyond the scope of his authority in making the statement. This
is determined with reference to state law for Erie purposesP1 and must
be determined with reference to the locus in a conflicts case, since the
lex loci is looked to in order to ascertain the scope of an agent's
authority.
Most of the rules of evidence are "neutral." Their invocation may
benefit either party. However, there are some rules that are intended
to and can benefit only one party. Consider a case such as Willitt v.
Purvis. 52 In this Erie situation, state law prohibited any evidence in
a wrongful death action to show that the spouse or child plaintiff did
not get along with the decedent. Such evidence might be relevant to
246. Pass v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 242 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1957).
247. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Childs, 272 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1959).
248. This is also true as to whether the court will take judicial notice of foreign law
or the law of another state in a conflicts situation, assuming the foreign law can be
proved. See Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941). But in Walton v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), where Saudi
Arabian law was involved and no proof of it was introduced, the court looked to the
state practice to determine if judicial notice could be taken and concluded that it could
not.
249. 125 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark. 1954).
250. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
251. Shahid v. Gulf Power Co., 291 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1961).
252. 276 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1960).
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reduce the amount of recovery on the ground that a decedent would
contribute less to a family which he did not like. The court refused to
admit the evidence on the ground that it was really a rule for measuring
damages in death cases. The fact that this rule was expressed in evi-
dentiary form did not alter its purpose, which was to prohibit con-
sideration of possible failure to support in fixing the amount of re-
covery. Since recovery should be determined with reference to the
lex loci in conflicts cases, the forum should incorporate that law of
the locus which is designed to affect recovery.
Another example of a rule cast in evidentiary form which can
materially affect the outcome is the Dead Man's Statute, a matter
which is controlled by state law in an Erie situation.2 18 The purpose
of such a statute is to benefit a party claiming under a decedent or
the decedent's representative. When a claim is made against the dece-
dent's estate, rebuttal proof of the face-to-face transactions upon which
the claim is generally based will often be lacking. The invocation of
the rule is likely to have a material effect upon the outcome, since
it prevents testimony which would tend to be damaging to the party
claiming under the decedent and which would be difficult to rebut.
If the locus has such a statute, it should be used as a model by the
forum. There is no question of the judge's being accustomed to operat-
ing under a different evidentiary scheme, as the rule is statutory and
questions can be determined at leisure. The forum's policy favoring
admission of all relevant evidence would be outweighed, moreover,
by the fact that the locus has decided to benefit parties claiming
under the decedent, and that the admissibility vel non may have a
material effect on the outcome. If the locus does not have such a statute,
but the forum does, then it is possible to construct an argument that
the forum considers it unfair to permit such testimony. This argument
is a weak one, though, for there is nothing inherently unfair about
admitting such testimony, and the witness can always be cross-ex-
amined. The nonexistence of such a statute represents the policy
of the locus that a party in a proceeding against the estate of a dead
man should not suffer greater difficulties because of his death. In both
instances the admissibility of such evidence may materially affect
the outcome and should therefore be determined with reference to the
lex loci.
253. In Pritchard v. Nelson, 228 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1955), the court assumed without
discussion that the state statute was applicable. In Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 743 (1946), the court arrived at the same result by holding
that the evidence was inadmissible under the state law and was not admissible under
the other provisions of Rule 43(a).
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In light of this, the result in Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach"'z1 seems
improper. A state statute prohibited the taking of a statement from
an insured property owner and excluded it at trial unless the owner
had been furnished with a copy of the statement. The federal court
held that the statement was admissible in a diversity case when sought
to be used primarily for impeachment purposes. The court based its
decision on the facts that: (1) impeachment evidence is rarely so
decisive in nature as to have a significant effect upon the outcome;
(2) the insurer could get a statement by other means under state law;
and (3) the plaintiff did not try to get a copy of the statement by
pre-trial discovery.
While the purpose of the statute may have been to see that the
insured received a copy of the statement, the fact remains that the
evidence would have been inadmissible in the state court. Since it
would have been inadmissible, it is difficult to see the relevancy of
the claim that the insured could have received a statement by other
means. The sole question should have been the effect on the outcome.
While impeaching evidence ordinarily may not have a great effect, this
type of impeaching evidence would. It would show that the insured
told the jury one thing and told the insurer another. Since the state-
ment to the insurer would be in writing, its impact upon the jury
would be great. There is nothing unfair about prohibiting such evi-
dence, and the state law is not difficult to determine. Because of the
effect on the outcome, state law should be applied in an Erie case. If
such a requirement exists under the lex loci, it also should be recog-
nized by the forum in a conflicts case.25 i
Another case where the forum has ignored the effect of a rule of
evidence upon the outcome is Fornzey v. Morrison.-0 Under the lex loci,
testimony as to the conviction of a party for reckless driving was ad-
missible in an action for personal injuries arising out of the same trans-
action. Under the lex fori it was not. The defendants sought to introduce
the evidence, and it was held that the lex Jori applied to prevent its
introduction. The court said that since such a conviction did not bar
recovery under the lex loci, the matter related merely to admissibility
254. 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
255. For conflicts purposes consideration must also be devoted to the converse
situation, where evidence is inadmissible in the forum unless a written copy is given
but is admissible in the lex loci without the requirement. Here, the forum should bar
the evidence. The statute represents the forum's view as to fairness. Certain types of
impeachment evidence should be inadmissible unless the party against whom it is sought
to be used has received a copy. Moreover, this represents an attempt by the forum to
insure compliance by imposing the sanction of nonadmissibility of the evidence. Since the
case is tried in the forum, its procedural policy must prevail.
256. 144 W. Va. 722, 110 S.E.2d 840 (1959).
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of evidence and was "procedural." Had the law of the locus barred
recovery upon such a conviction, the lex loci would apply. Conversely,
if the law of the locus imposed absolute civil liability upon a defendant
who had been found guilty of reckless driving, this law would be
recognized. The effect of the rule of the locus is quite similar to that of
certain presumptions. The introduction of such evidence practically
assures that the result will go against the party convicted of reckless
driving unless he can carry out the difficult task of convincing the
jury that the conviction was improper. This is another example of
absolute liability with a qualification, a matter having a very material
effect upon the outcome. In view of this fact, and since the rule of the
locus is easily ascertained, admissibility should be determined with
reference to the lex loci.
As to the difficult evidentiary problem of confidential communica-
tions, the considerations for Erie and conflicts purposes differ. If the
evidence sought to be excluded is so significant that erroneous exclu-
sion or admission would be prejudicial error, it can be said that the
operation of privilege materially affects the outcome. For Erie purposes
the matter is controlled by state law. 7 However, in an Erie situation
the federal and state courts sit in the same place. A case can never arise
where one of them has a different interest because it alone is sitting in
the state where the communication was made. In a conflicts situation,
however, the interest of the forum may differ from that of the
locus because one or the other is the place where the communication
was made. The purpose of a privilege is to protect the confidential
nature of certain communications. Irrespective of the effect upon the
outcome, the state where the communication is made is the only state
having an interest in protecting this confidentiality.2 8 If the com-
munication is made in the forum, the forum's law should determine
whether a privilege attaches. It is the only state having an interest in
the matter, so there is no reason why the lex loci should be used as a
model. If the communication was made in the locus and is not privi-
leged there, then the privilege should not be recognized, even though
the forum would hold the communication privileged. The forum has
257. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
965 (1956).
258. This approach has been taken in a case involving out-of-state discovery. In
Matter of Franklin Washington Trust Co., 1 Misc. 2d 697, 148 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct.
1956), the plaintiff in a New Jersey action sought to take depositions in New York
over the defense of the attorney-client privilege. It was held that New York law governed
as to privilege since the communications were made in New York. See also Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 104 Colo. 13, 87 P.2d 758 (1939), saying that whether testimony
in a prior suit constituted waiver when testimony was sought for deposition purposes
would be determined in accordance with the law of the state where the suits were filed.
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no interest in assuring confidentiality where the communication was
made in another state. There will be a conflict if the communication is
privileged at the locus but is not privileged under the lex fori. In that
case the forum's policy favoring admissibility is adversely affected, but
the interest is not so strong as to outweigh the locus' interest in pro-
tecting confidentiality.
In summary, most questions of admissibility, competency, and
relevancy of evidence should be determined by the lex Jori, either be-
cause they do not have a material effect upon the outcome or because
the interference with the effective operation of the forum's judicial
system would be too great if the lex loci were adopted. However,
questions as to rules of evidence which are intended to benefit a
particular party should be determined with respect to the lex loci,
since they are likely to have a material effect upon the outcome, and
since their recognition will not interfere with the evidentiary pattern
which the forum's judges are accustomed to. Whether communications
are privileged should be determined with reference to the law of the
state where the communication was made, since it is the only state
having any interest in insuring confidentiality.
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury
It is in this area that the procedural policy of the forum is most
significant. The forum will not use the lex loci as a model when the
effect will be to cause a type of trial that the forum considers improper.
The forum knows how far its juries can be trusted and when its judges
must act. It also knows when the mitigating effects of a jury trial are
needed to guard against judicial harshness. The forum has the respon-
sibility for seeing that justice is done in its courts, even if it is acting as
a forum of convenience. As Professor Morgan has pointed out:
It goes without saying that ... [the plaintiff] cannot ask state A
to set up special machinery for the purpose of handling litigation im-
ported from state B or a special method or means of stimulating A's
tribunals to act. He must use the machinery and method which A has
provided and which it uses in litigation originating in A. The materials
which the parties can be permitted to feed into A's machine must be
such as it can satisfactorily process. Experience with that machinery
has convinced the courts of A that it can operate efficiently and turn out
a satisfactory product by using specified kinds of raw materials and no
others 259
-Moreover, in many instances the allocation of a particular function to
259. Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 Vand. L. Rev.
467, 469 (1957). Morgan's position on evidentiary matters is equally applicable to
judge-jury allocation.
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the judge or the jury will not appreciably affect the outcome any more
than would the mere fact that suit is brought at the forum rather than
the locus.
This limitation has been recognized in the Erie situation, so that
federal law governs as to whether an issue is triable by the judge or
jury. This may be because the matter does not materially affect the
outcome, or because federal procedural policy-which may or may not
be a constitutional requirement-controls. For conflicts purposes, there
is no need to be concerned with constitutional limitations on the forum's
power to apply its procedural policy, since it occupies a different posi-
tion in its role as a forum of convenience than do federal courts in Erie
situations.
A discussion of whether a particular issue is to be tried by a judge
or a jury may begin with a consideration of the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc2 0° There
the issue arose as to whether the plaintiff was an employee of the de-
fendant within the meaning of the state workmen's compensation
statute, so that the statute barred him from bringing an action for
personal injuries. Under the state practice this issue was to be deter-
mined by the judge; under the federal practice, by the jury. The
court held that federal practice governed. It concluded that whether
this issue was triable by the judge or jury was not likely to materially
affect the outcome.20' Moreover, the Court emphasized the traditional
role of the jury in the federal courts as reflected in the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by jury, though it said that
it was not necessary to decide whether this question was covered by
the Seventh Amendment. 202 In the later case of Magenau v. Aetna
Freight Lines, Inc.,21 3 involving identical facts, the Supreme Court
emphasized the lack of effect upon the outcome, observing again that
determination by the judge did not represent "an integral part of the
special relationship created by the statute. 2 64
These cases are best explained by the absence of an effect upon
the outcome. In the ordinary case, a judge's reaction to the facts will
260. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
261. The court also noted the power of the federal judge to comment on the evidence
and to grant a new trial, as well as the fact that the result could differ according to
which jury panel tried it. But see Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S, 359 (1952),
holding that in FELA actions there must be a jury trial even if state practice does not
authorize one.
262. See the discussion of this point in Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh
Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 Texas L. Rev. 549 (1949).
263. 360 U.S. 273 (1959).
264. 360 U.S. at 278, quoting from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356
U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
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not differ from that of a jury merely because he is a judge. -05 There-
fore, even without considering the forum's procedural policy, there is
no occasion to use the lex loci as a model. -00 On certain issues, how-
ever, it may make a difference whether the judge or jury decides the
question. The clearest example is the issue of contributory negligence.
Juries often apply comparative negligence despite an instruction not
to do so. Because of the lack of precision implicit in fixing money
damages for pain and suffering, it rarely can be shown that a verdict
has been the result of compromise. Indeed where a state provides
that the issue of contributory negligence is to be determined solely
by the jury, this may represent a compromise between a fear of
blanket comparative negligence and a desire that the doctrine be
applied in certain cases. It may also represent an apprehension that
judges are too apt to grant directed verdicts on the issue of contribu-
tory negligence, so that many retrials may be required. Whether the
judge can direct a verdict on the issue of contributory negligence is
likely to have a material effect upon the outcome of many cases.
This does not mean, however, that the forum should apply the
rules of the lex loci pertaining to the judge-jury relationship, for these
rules are not intended to apply outside of the locus. Where the locus
requires that the issue of contributory negligence be determined solely
by the jury, it is concerned with its judges and juries. The forum may
decide to trust its judges more and its juries less. The procedural policy
of the forum may prohibit the jury from employing comparative negli-
gence on an ad hoc basis in a case which, under the forum's procedural
policy, should never get to the jury in the first place. Using this aspect
of the lex loci as a model may even violate a constitutional com-
mand, where the guarantee to trial by jury is interpreted to mean
that the judge must have the power to direct a verdict in a proper
case. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Seventh Amend-
ment guarantee means that the judge must have the power to direct a
265. The result may differ, just as it might be different if the ase were heard by one
jury panel rather than another. For example, juries drawn from urban areas differ
greatly in attitude from those drawn from rural areas within the same state. See Morgan,
Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 194-95 (1944). However,
these differences are not "effects upon the outcome" in an analytical sense.
266. See, e.g., Spencer v. Bright, 159 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Ky. 1958) (applying
Kentucky law). See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 594 (1934).
These same considerations mean that the lex fori should also govern in determining
whether the nature of relief which the plaintiff is seeking is historically legal or
equitable, insofar as this relates to the right to trial by jury. For Erie cases involving
this point see Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943); Larsen v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1954); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. Kielhorn, 98 F. Supp. 288 (W.). Mich. 1951).
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verdict in a proper case. In Herron v. Southern Pac. Co.,"0 7 the Su-
preme Court held that a federal court could direct a verdict on the
issue of contributory negligence, even though state practice left the
issue exclusively to the jury. As the Court observed:
The controlling principle governing the decision of the present question
is that state laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a
federal court. The function of the trial judge in a federal court is not
in any sense a local matter, and state statutes which would interfere
with the appropriate performance of that function are not binding upon
the federal court under either the Conformity Act or the "rules of de-
cision" Act. 268
This approach has been followed by the lower courts subsequent to
Erie.69
A fortiori, the forum should not use this aspect of the lex loci
as a model in a conflicts case, because of the violation of the forum's
strong procedural policy as to the power of the court to direct a verdict.
In Hopkins v. Kurn,21° the Missouri court passed on the question
whether to follow a provision of Oklahoma law leaving the assumption
of risk issue solely to the jury in a case where the injury occurred in
Oklahoma. The court refused to do so on the ground that the statute
had been construed by Oklahoma as "procedural." The case relied
upon, however, involved a local law question, and should have had no
relevance. The point was that the court simply refused to deny the
power to its courts to direct a verdict. The locus controls judges and
juries at the locus, but the forum is concerned with its own judges and
juries. The allocation of functions represents a strong procedural
policy of the forum which may be embodied in its constitution.2 1 This
267. 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
268. 283 U.S. at 94.
269. In Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942), the court
held that an Oklahoma rule requiring that the issue of assumption of risk be determined
by the jury was inapplicable in a federal court though jurisdiction was founded on
diversity of citizenship. Both Herron and Deiderich were cited with approval in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. at 538-39, 539 n.14. See also Guthrie v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1945), holding that a state statute providing against
directed verdicts in libel actions is not binding on a federal court. See also Rand v. Under-
writers at Lloyd's, 295 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 988 (1961), holding that
the reasonableness of notice to an insurer is to be decided by the judge or jury according
to federal and not state law.
270. 351 Mo. 41, 171 S.W.2d 625 (1943).
271. A contrary result was reached in Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Miller, 184 Ark. 61,
41 S.W.2d 971 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 688 (1932). The Arkansas court held
that it would apply the same Oklahoma statute, even though Arkansas judges had the
power to direct verdicts in all cases. The court reasoned only that Oklahoma law
governed the rights and liabilities of the parties, ignoring its own procedural policy,
possibly expressed in its constitution.
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should preclude the use of the lex loci as a model. Where the forum
does not permit a directed verdict on the issue of contributory negli-
gence, the lex Jori should govern despite the effect on the outcome.
The forum must be able to regulate its own judges and implement its
own idea of a fair trial.
The forum's procedural policy is also involved in the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury. The issue is
not whether the court can direct a verdict, but what criteria it may
employ in deciding whether a case should go to the jury. Standards
differ from state to state. One may permit the case to go to the jury on
slight evidence while another may require the evidence to be such
that reasonable minds could differ. One state may rule that the suf-
ficiency of the evidence is determined solely by the plaintiff's evidence,
while another may look to the defendant's as well. The standard fol-
lowed to determine sufficiency may materially affect the outcome,
for it determines whether a party definitely prevails or whether he
must take his chances with the jury.ms
The forum knows how far it can trust its juries, and it has views
as to the fairness of letting a jury decide the case when a certain
quantum of evidence has been presented. It is responsible for assuring
a fair result. Moreover, the court is conditioned to thinking of the
sufficiency of the evidence according to its own standards. These
standards are not precise, and it is difficult to apply a shifting standard
to the facts of a particular case where the standard of the locus is
different. Finally, it must be remembered that the courts of the forum
will bear the burden if a new trial has to be granted because the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. The forum may be concerned
with overburdening its judicial system with new trials in cases which
should not have gone to the jury in the first place.
Under Erie, which law governs as to the sufficiency of evidence
to take the case to the jury is not clear. In the comparatively early
case of Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,273 it was held that the issue
was to be determined with reference to state law.274 However, some
other courts have indicated that the matter involves judge-jury relation-
ships within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, so that the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to take the case to the jury must be determined
272. Of 'course, whether liability exists as a matter of law is determined by the Iex
lod. See Neal v. Kropp, 299 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. CL App. 1957).
273. 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
274. Accord, Avlon v. Greencha Holding Corp., 239 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1956); General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Schero, 160 F.2d 775 (Sth Cir. 1947); Lemning v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1941); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 107
F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1939).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1962]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
by federal law. 75 In its most recent pronouncement, the Supreme Court
noted the conflict, but left the question open. 7
In the Erie situation the question is complicated by whether Erie
represents a constitutional doctrine and whether sufficiency of the evi-
dence relates to the Seventh Amendment. If Erie does represent a
constitutional doctrine, then federal law cannot govern on a matter
which affects the outcome unless sufficiency of the evidence raises a
question under the Seventh Amendment. In a conflicts case no such
problem arises. The role of a foreign court is different from that of a
federal court applying state law, at least insofar as constitutional
questions are concerned, and the court of the forum may give full
play to its procedural policy. Courts have held that the question of
sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury is determined
by the lex Jori.71 This is as it should be. The forum is dealing with
its juries and is trying the case in its courts. It must insure fairness
and has its own ideas as to when the jury can legitimately be permitted
to pass on a question.
The power of the judge to comment on the evidence either has no
material effect upon the outcome or represents the forum's notion
as to what the jury should hear. 78 It should therefore be determined by
the lex ori.27 The outcome may be affected if the judge suggests the
amount of the verdict, but this also relates to the proper role of the
275. Allen v. Matson Nay. Co., 255 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1958); Pogue v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957); Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
276. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 399 U.S. 437 (1959). There both parties had
assumed that the state standard was applicable, the lower court did not discuss tho
question, and the Court concluded that there was no real difference between the federal
and the state standards in the context of the case. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., Inc., the Court distinguished Stoner on the ground that there the jury did pass on
the question and the issue was merely as to the standard. 356 U.S. 525, 540 n.15.
277. Boland v. Love, 222 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Childress v. Johnston Motor
Lines, Inc., 235 N.C. 522, 70 S.E.2d 558 (1952). See also Restatement, Conflict of
Laws § 595, comment b (1934).
A similar question is presented when an appellate court considers whether to grant
a new trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict. The
forum must decide whether its judges should exercise discretion over jury verdicts. The
forum is responsible for the fairness of the actions of its juries. This is equally true as
to the issue of remittitur, since this is a substitute for a new trial. The forum must
decide whether it will permit a party to avoid a new trial by taking less, since the
burden of a new trial will be on its courts. Stevens v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 SAV.2d
122 (Mo. 1962). Cf. Smith v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 58 Wash. 2d 361, 363 P.2d 133
(1961), holding that state law as to the sufficiency of the evidence upon a motion for a
new trial governed in a Jones Act case. But see Meissner v. Papas, 124 F.2d 720 (7th
Cir. 1941), approving the approach of the lower court in following the state standard
as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the state practice as to remittitur.
278. Reuter v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 226 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1955).
279. D'Antoni v. Teche Lines, Inc., 163 Miss. 668, 143 So. 415 (1932).
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judge in advising the jury. Since the case is being tried in the forum,
the forum must decide whether its juries are too susceptible to the
influence of the judge280
With regard to the allocation of judge-jury functions, then, it is
submitted that the lex Jori should always govern. Either these matters
do not materially affect the outcome or they involve the forum's notion
of what is necessary to a fair trial or the efficient operation of its
judicial system. It is here that the underlying rationale of the sub-
stance-procedure distinction is sound. Courts, realizing that they may
apply their own law in such situations, will be more apt to incorporate
the analytically procedural law of the locus that materially affects the
outcome when to do so will not affect the forum's strong procedural
policy or the efficient operation of the forum's judicial system.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The Supreme Court has not entered the field of limiting state
determinations as to how much of the lex loci should be incorporated
in conflicts cases. Since the matter is in flux, it cannot be said that a
state acts unreasonably when it decides that all questions which are
analytically procedural are to be determined by the lex Jori. Just as
the states are given great discretion in their choice of law rules,281
they can decide how much of the lex loci they are willing to bring over
without being said to have acted unreasonably.
The constitutional law cases have involved questions which are
slightly different from those found in the normal conflicts case. In
some, the forum has attempted to deny enforcement of an interest
created by the locus in violation of the full faith and credit clause
and the due process clause. In others, there has been an attempt to
refuse to effectively enforce a statutory claim established by a sister
state by prescribing too narrow a remedy.
280. In Gillen v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 198 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1952), it was held
that the state practice whereby the judge in awarding damages without a jury referred
to verdicts in substantially similar cases as a guide was not binding on the federal court.
It found that this did not constitute a limitation on the amount recoverable, and further
emphasized that it would violate the principle that the judge cannot suggest the
amount of the verdict. Hence, it would be incompatible with the proper function of
judge and jury.
281. See Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916), holding that a state may, con-
sistent with due process, determine that the validity of a cancellation of a land contract
is determined by the lex loci rei sitae rather than by the lex loci contractus. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914), is explainable on the ground that
interstate commerce was adversely affected or that a federal enclave was involved, but
not on the basis that the lex loci delicti must always be the place where the injury was
suffered.
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In Broderick v. Rosner,"2 a New Jersey statute barred all actions
by foreign corporations for statutory assessments except suits for
equitable accountings. The statute also provided that necessary parties
for such equitable suits included the defendant corporation, its legal
representatives, all of its creditors, and all of its stockholders. Such a
restriction would have blocked the enforcement of any claim against
defendants in the forum, since the suing corporation could not join
necessary parties residing elsewhere. The court held that a forum can
ordinarily decide what remedy to give, but cannot bar actions created
by sister states by prescribing one exclusive and ineffective remedy.
The full faith and credit clause was designed to prevent such attempts
to protect residents from legitimate claims created by the law of sister
states. In a similar vein is Converse v. Hamilton.28 3 There it was held
that the forum could not deny standing to sue to the receiver of a
corporation involved in liquidation proceedings in a sister state.
Despite the forum's power to determine parties, it had to recognize the
receiver's status and allow him to enforce a claim on behalf of creditors
of the corporation.
Another difficult situation occurs when the forum applies its
statute of limitations to determine whether a claim is barred, disre-
garding a shorter limitation period contained in an agreement between
the parties. Under the right-remedy distinction, there would be nothing
to prevent the forum from constitutionally entertaining suit after the
running of the locus' statute of limitations. But a time limitation in a
contract is not the same as one in a statute of the locus. The validity of
a contract is a matter which is analytically substantive under any
characterization, and a state cannot alter the terms of a contract by
stating that the matter is one of procedure. Thus, a forum may not
entertain suit after the period for bringing suit under a contract has
expired. 2 4
Finally, the forum cannot use its policy as to judge-jury allocation
to refuse to recognize a complete defense created by the lex loci. In
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,285 an insurance policy was
executed and delivered in New York. It was agreed that all matters
relating to the policy were governed by New York law. A New York
statute provided that false representation as to prior medical care
282. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
283. 224 U.S. 243 (1912).
284. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In Order of United Commercial
Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), the same principle was applied to a holding of
the state of incorporation that its statute of limitations for recovery of death benefits
formed a part of the contract of membership.
285. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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enabled an insurance company to avoid the contract as a matter of
law. Suit was brought in Georgia. The Georgia courts held that it was
for the jury to decide whether the insured had made material mis-
representations enabling the insurer to avoid the contract. The Su-
preme Court reversed on the ground that the forum had failed to
recognize a defense created by the lex loci. The question was not
whether the issue of false representations was to be determined by the
court or jury. Under the lex loci, the company was not liable once
such misrepresentation was made. On the basis of undisputed facts
liability did not exist under the lex loci, so there could be no question
to submit to the jury.
These cases present no real problems. The forum cannot alter
the nature of the interest created by the locus by applying its "pro-
cedural" law to matters analytically substantive. With this exception,
the extent to which the forum should incorporate the lex loci as a model
is not a constitutional question.
IV
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to analyze the extent to which the forum will
incorporate the law of the locus as a model. The matter traditionally
has been approached conceptually in terms of substance and pro-
cedure. This approach ignores realities and makes the outcome of a
given case depend upon the forum in which suit is brought.
When the forum decides to look to the law of another state, it
becomes a forum of convenience. The result in a foreign case which
it entertains should be no different from the result which would obtain
at the locus, since, ideally, it is there that suit should have been
brought. The forum is in much the same position as a federal court
hearing a matter which is governed by the law of the state in which
it sits. The federal court hears the case only because this is thought
necessary to prevent prejudice against out-of-state litigants. The Erie
outcome test has furnished a sound guide for the federal courts, and
the same approach can furnish an equally effective guide for the forum
in a conflicts case.
The forum is, however, responsible for the fairness of any trial
held in its courts. Moreover, it cannot permit interference with the
efficient operation of its judicial system merely because it must look
to some of the law of another state as a model. By the same token,
federal courts have certain responsibilities and must operate within
the requirements of the federal constitution. Thus, neither can in-
corporate all of the law of the reference state. The forum in a con-
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flicts case may have greater discretion in implementing its own pro-
cedural policy than the federal courts, but the difference is not too
great. In this respect, the Erie outcome test also may furnish sound
guidance.
It is submitted that to the extent that a matter in question ma-
terially affects the outcome, it should be determined with reference
to the law of the locus, except where to do so would interfere with
the efficient operation of the .forum's judicial system or violate some
strong procedural policy of the forum. When the forum decides to
refer to the law of another state and incorporate that law as a model,
it has decided that it is a forum of convenience and has no interest
in the outcome of the litigation. Its only concern is to see that the
proceedings are fair and are in accordance with its own experience
as to what is necessary for the effective administration of justice.
Analytical concepts may furnish an adit to a problem, but should
not represent the final solution. As long as suits can be brought in any
jurisdiction where a party can be served personally, the forum will
often be one of convenience and will have to make reference to thq
law of another state or states. Therefore, when the forum decides that
it would have been best if suit had been brought in another state, it
should strive to effectuate as nearly as possible the result which would
have obtained had suit been brought in the reference state. It is diffi-
cult to see how this can be accomplished by conceptualization divorced
from the realistic effects of a decision. It is submitted that the approach
outlined is a realistic one, can substantially insure the desired similarity
of results, and can be effectuated without destroying the role of the
forum as an independent tribunal administering justice.
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